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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background
The sharing economy is disrupting the transportation industry worldwide. A more complex
mobility system is emerging. There are new actors, such as online platforms (BlaBlaCar, Uber
and many others) and non-professional service providers (individuals who share their vehicles
and rides). New transport services, such as ridesharing and ride-splitting are spreading. Thanks
to price-comparison websites, booking apps, and others, a more fluid interaction among the
different transport modes as well as among the different transportation players is emerging.
This new mobility ecosystem, however, will need to be sustainable. Transportation requires
major investments in infrastructure. As this disruption of the transportation industry unfolds, it
becomes necessary to understand how these changes affect investments. In the EU in
particular, regulation can play a relevant role to set the right incentives for all players to
participate in the funding of the infrastructures, both in terms of maintenance and the
development of transportation infrastructures.
Aim
The purpose of this study is to identify the existing and the potential impact of the sharing
economy on the funding of transportation infrastructures.
The study uses a broad definition of infrastructures, which includes the underlying physical
infrastructures, such as roads, tracks, stations, airports, etc., as well as assets for the provision
of transport services such as buses, railways, rolling stock, along with all the necessary support
systems, including maintenance, staff, and more.
A new layer, the data layer, is emerging on top of the traditional physical infrastructure layer
and the services layer. Online platforms are establishing themselves as managers of this new
data layer (in transportation), yet their business models continue to rely on the existing
infrastructure. Therefore it is necessary to ensure that the new players and new services enrich
the transportation ecosystem without threatening the financial sustainability of the
indispensable underlying infrastructure.
A wide definition is also used when it comes to the concept of “sharing economy”, which can
be understood as “a new socio-economic model that has taken off thanks to the technological
revolution, with the internet connecting people through online platforms on which transactions
involving goods and services can be conducted securely and transparently” (European
Parliament, 2015c, para. 110).
Scope
Shared mobility: a rising challenge
The value of the sharing economy transaction in the transportation industry – the so-called
“shared mobility” – in Europe in 2015 has been estimated at EUR 5.1 billion, growing at a rate
of 77% from the previous year. This value is expected to reach more than EUR 100 billion in
2025. The revenue of transportation platforms in 2015 was estimated to be EUR 1.6 billion, up
97% from 2014 (PwC, 2016).
Europe is leading in shared mobility solutions, such as subscription-based bike- and car-sharing.
The global leader in the carsharing industry is a European company, car2go, and Europe is the
continent with the highest revenue for the provision of carsharing services, i.e., around EUR
230 million in 2015 (BCG, 2016).
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However, when it comes to urban shared mobility solutions based on highly developed
platforms, such as Uber and Lyft, the US and Asia are the global leaders. That is also where
more sophisticated services, such as ride-splitting are currently emerging.
The situation is different when it comes to long-distance carpooling: here the world leader is
the French platform BlaBlaCar. For example, the number of passenger–km mediated by
BlaBlaCar in France in 2015 reached 12% of the passenger-km managed by SNCF, the French
railway undertaking, in domestic long distance passenger services (DGDD, 2016). The value of
BlaBlaCar transaction for France is estimated to be EUR 210 million in 2015.
Less revenue from passenger fares
The immediate challenge posed by shared mobility to transport infrastructure funding is the
reduction in revenues from travellers’ fares, as travellers migrate from traditional mass-transit
services to new shared mobility services.
Among the different forms of shared mobility, carpooling has the greatest potential to affect
traditional transportation. Carpooling empowers owners to make more efficient use of their
private vehicles and it is substituting traditional long-distance transportation services (railway
and coach), thereby reducing the revenue of existing operators. In France, 71% of long distance
carpooling passengers would have used traditional transportation had carpooling not been
available, and 64% of car-pooling users are travelling less by train. Carpooling has reduced the
number of domestic long distance railway passengers in France by approximately 6% in 2015
(DGDD, 2016).
Shared mobility is not a substitute but rather a complement to urban transportation. Moreover,
it is reducing private car usage and ownership, albeit, on a very small scale so far. Mobility as
a Service (MaaS), the combined commercialisation of different transportation services by a
single provider, may well be the future of urban transportation.
Revenue for traditional transportation is reduced as the substitution of traditional long-distance
transportation services by carpooling takes place. Such a reduction is indirectly affecting the
revenue of railway infrastructure managers, particularly in countries where railway
infrastructure funding heavily relies on access-charges imposed on railway undertakings
(France, Belgium and Germany in particular). No substantial effect is identified for road
infrastructure funding, as it does not rely so significantly on tolls, and in any case, carpoolers
also pay road tolls.
Revenue reduction might trigger a vicious cycle of reduction in frequencies and further
reductions in passengers in long-distance railway and coach services. Furthermore, such
substitution increases the cost of Public Service Obligations (PSO) and threatens the
sustainability of PSO financing thanks to internal cross subsidies in an undertaking with
exclusive rights for the provision of packages of both profitable and non-profitable services.
Revenue of railway infrastructure managers is also reduced.
However, in the long run the situation could also reverse. As private vehicle ownership
diminishes at the urban level due to the attractiveness of alternatives to the private vehicle
(both new shared mobility and traditional public transportation), travellers will increasingly rely
on alternatives to private vehicles for long distance trips. It is estimated that if 10% of private
vehicle users stop using their cars, the number of passengers using alternative services,
including traditional public transport and shared mobility solutions, would double.
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Other challenges
Online platforms can reduce the funding available for transportation infrastructures by
capturing a growing share of the value created in the entire mobility ecosystem. Online
platforms charge commissions for their intermediation services. Such commissions are typically
set around 20% and have even reached 30% of the total value of each transaction. Value
capture does not seem to be an issue at the moment, as platforms have created new markets.
Platform users, both drivers and passengers, keep growing despite commissions. However, as
platforms might take a leading role in integrated mobility solutions, including traditional
services (such as Mobility as a Service), commissions might capture part of the already tight
revenue of traditional public transportation companies, both urban and long distance.
It is important to ensure that as shared mobility evolves, all players in the mobility ecosystem
contribute to the funding of infrastructures without freeriding. The examples of media,
telecommunications and electricity show that freeriding can reduce the available financing for
infrastructures. While the same effect is not observable to a significant extent in transportation
yet, this may well happen in the future as platforms start commercializing both traditional public
transportation services and new shared mobility solutions under a single roof. The conditions
(i.e. pricing) to be negotiated between platforms and traditional public transportation providers
(often public authorities) will be of a key importance.
As public subsidies are a major source of infrastructure financing, it is important to ensure that
new players such as platforms and non-professional providers contribute to the funding of
infrastructures.
Finally, transportation platforms concentrate a great amount of interesting data that can be
commercialised. However, new revenue derived from big data management might not be
reinvested in infrastructure.
Recommendations
1. More statistical information, particularly in an EU-standardized format on shared
mobility is necessary. National best practices should be monitored to produce a good
set of data from surveys, web-crawling and traditional statistics at EU level.
2. New shared mobility services should be integrated into the existing regulation.
This way, legal certainty will increase and coherent regulatory policies across all
transport modes, both traditional and new, will be possible. Most of the competences on
transport regulation are national but the EU has competences to ensure the free
provision of information society services.
3. Shared mobility should be promoted as a substitute for the use and ownership
of the private vehicle. Specific measures are proposed: (i) Promote each single shared
mobility service, in particular ensuring legal certainty; (ii) Promote the complementarity
of shared mobility to mass-transit services (first mile/last mile, etc.); (iii) Promote
Mobility as a Service as the instrument to combine mass-transit and shared mobility
services as a valid alternative to the private vehicle. Transport infrastructure will benefit
from the increase of passengers and revenue in mass-transit systems.
4. In limited cases, shared mobility might compete with mass-transit services. A level
playing field is necessary. It is recommended to eliminate potential regulatory
advantages that favour shared mobility over mass-transit services, such as
undue exemptions from charges for the use of the infrastructure, taxes, social
contributions, or PSO financing, particularly when such advantages go against the
commonly agreed policy objectives to reduce congestion, environmental damage and
accidents.
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5. Shared mobility should be taken into consideration for the redefinition of some
public service policies. Competition from shared mobility is threatening cross-
subsidies in mass-transit franchises of profitable service and non-profitable services.
This is often the case when minimum frequencies are imposed and peak services finance
off-peak services. At the same time, shared mobility provides new possibilities for a
more efficient provision of public service.
6. As a new data layer emerges over the traditional physical infrastructure layer and
transport service layer, it is recommended to closely follow the evolution of
platforms’ activities in order to identify at an early stage arrangements that
challenge the financing of infrastructure. Challenges to financing can derive from
value capture by platforms in the form of commissions. They can also derive from
freeriding as in the case of telecommunications and energy infrastructure.
7. Online platforms are centralising a large amount of data on mobility. It should be
ensured that online platforms share big data on itineraries, frequency, duration and
other travel parameters. Similarly, online platforms are well positioned to share data
with public authorities for the management of taxes and other legal obligations.
Infrastructure funding challenges in the sharing economy
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
Digitalisation is disrupting the transportation industry just as it previously disrupted media,
telecommunications and other industries. Thanks to digitalisation the “sharing economy” is on
the rise also in transport. A series of new applications and digital platforms are essentially
bringing down the transaction costs of sharing and thereby scaling up such well known activities
as carpooling to a size that makes them a relevant competitor on the market for transport
services. At the same time new services based on the concept of sharing either a ride or a
vehicle are rapidly growing.
These new services and new service providers use traditional infrastructure, even if they access
it in new and creative ways. The sharing economy does not change the fundamental fact that
transportation requires physical infrastructures and the transportation ecosystem will only be
viable as long as the necessary funding is available for the development and maintenance of
this infrastructure. The failure to adequately invest in the transport infrastructure might
eventually even limit the potential of the EU economic growth and prosperity.
The aim of this study is to evaluate how the sharing economy might disrupt the existing funding
instruments for transport infrastructure. It analyses the impact of shared transport on
traditional forms of infrastructure funding, particularly on revenue derived from traveller fares,
as shared transport might substitute existing transport modes and capture a portion of such
revenue. The study also examines how shared transport contributes to infrastructure funding
in the form of tax payments.
Based on the results of the analysis, the study concludes with some policy recommendations.
They mainly focus on three goals: to ensure transparency on how shared transport affects
investment, to stimulate the right incentives for all players to participate in the funding of the
infrastructure, and to guarantee the availability of the necessary investment to maintain and
develop transport infrastructure in Europe.
1.2 Methodology
The analysis of the infrastructure funding challenges in the sharing economy faces some specific
difficulties. There is no universally recognised definition of what the sharing economy is.
Therefore, the study’s point of departure is the analysis of the different definitions of the term,
and the identification of the definition that will be used throughout the study.
Furthermore, data on the sharing economy in transportation is scarce. Shared mobility services
are usually provided by small service providers, often non-professional ones. Such providers
do not publish statistical information about their activity. Online platforms aggregate all the
information about the services they intermediate, but this information is not published either.
Public authorities are starting to elaborate statistics, but they are not common yet. Therefore,
publicly available information is very limited.
For this study, we have identified the most relevant data on the magnitudes of shared mobility,
as well as data on the profiles of both service providers and consumers. Large surveys made
to shared mobility users provide interesting information. Particularly interesting data can be
extracted from online platforms through web-crawling technologies. Web crawlers are software
applications that automatically and repetitively derive information from the web. They allow for
the systematic extraction of information publicly available in online platforms. This makes it
possible to calculate the number of rides that are offered in the platform in a specific city or
route, evolution over time, etc. For this study, however, no web crawling exercise was used,
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but we have used as sources specific web crawling exercises by different entities, in particular
on carpooling platforms.
Finally, data on the sharing economy is fragmented. Rich data can be identified, for example
from web crawling exercises. However, such data are limited to a city, a route or even a country,
but it is not available under standard terms for a significant number of countries or over an
extended period of time. As a result, standard data across countries and along a significant
period does not exist.
In order to determine the impact of a shared economy on urban transportation and on long
distance mass transit, two empirical analyses on the relevant transportation segments have
been undertaken. Results confirm that the dynamics are different in these two transport
segments. For long distance transport, the only shared mobility service of relevance is
carpooling. Carsharing or ridesharing have very limited development on long distance.
Therefore, the analysis is focused on carpooling, and results show that it is partially substituting
mass-transit services. For urban transportation, there are several successful shared mobility
services (bikesharing, carsharing, ridesharing and ride-splitting). Carpooling, on the contrary,
has not caught up yet for short distances. At the moment, there is no evidence of substantial
substitution of mass-transit by shared mobility services. On the contrary, analyses suggests
that shared mobility complements urban mass-transit and, combined, creates an attractive
substitute for the private vehicle.
In both cases, the studies have been limited to land transportation. Other transport modes,
such as air transportation or maritime transportation, have not been included in the study, as
it had been confirmed that the effect of the sharing economy on these two transport modes
has been extremely limited for the moment. There are studies that demonstrate that the
substitutability between carpooling and air transport is very small, due to the difference in
prices and travel duration (UIC, 2016). Surveys also suggest that shared transport users do
not consider air travel as an alternative to shared transport (ADEME/6T, 2015). The same
reasoning applies to maritime transport.
The study has focussed on passenger transportation and it has not included freight
transportation. Again, the impact of the sharing economy has been more relevant in passenger
transportation up until now. The dynamics that evolve in this area are, however, relevant for
the entire transport system and will affect the freight sector as well. There is room for shared
transport of goods, particularly in short-distance transport, as providers are very fragmented,
and efficiency is low (for instance, there are a lot of empty runs). In the US, Uber is already
offering freight services possibly heralding a major disruption of the entire logistics sector
(McDermott, 2017).
For this study, we have opted to focus attention on those cities or countries where shared
mobility is more mature. Therefore, we looked at France for carpooling, Paris for bikesharing,
Berlin for carsharing, and San Francisco and other US cities for ride sharing and ride-splitting.
There is more information available for these locations. This information is also more
representative of the trends in shared mobility, as services are more mature. We have
complemented such in-depth analysis with references from other cities and countries, to
confirm our assumption that the trends identified in the leading cases could be extended to
other locations.
A further method used for the study is the analysis of the challenges faced in other network
industries, particularly telecommunications and energy. These industries are facing parallel
challenges. By extracting lessons from these parallel challenges, some potential threats to
transport infrastructure have been identified. Analysis on this point is more theoretical. As
shared transport is not as mature as parallel phenomena in the other industries, it is only
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possible to indicate how the industry might evolve, and the kind of challenges that might be
faced, but no specific figures can be provided.
Finally, in-depth interviews have been conducted with the most relevant players: online
platforms, traditional transport providers, infrastructure managers, transport authorities and
leading academics active in the fields of transportation and technology. The interviews have
put the existing data into perspective. They also confirm the extent of ongoing transformation
of the industry and identify new trends.
1.3 Structure of the study
The study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the concept of “sharing economy”,
describes the most popular shared mobility options, and points out the correlation between the
data layer and the transport infrastructure. Chapter 3 contains the analysis of the impact of the
sharing economy on long distance transportation. Chapter 4 focuses on the determination of
the effects of the sharing economy on urban transportation. Chapter 5 analyses the trends,
opportunities and risks posed by the sharing economy to transportation, and specifically to the
funding of infrastructure. Finally, Chapter 6 provides recommendations to be considered at the
EU or national level.
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2. SHARING ECONOMY AND TRANSPORT
INFRASTRUCTURE
KEY FINDINGS
 The concept of “sharing economy” has been defined as “a new socio-economic model
that has taken off thanks to the technological revolution, with the internet connecting
people through online platforms on which transactions involving goods and services can
be conducted securely and transparently” (European Parliament, 2015c, para. 110).
 Enabled by technology, new transport modes emerged that are neither traditional
private transport (private car, motorbike or bicycle) nor mass-transit services (railways,
coaches, urban buses, subway, etc.). These are referred to here as shared mobility
services or shared modes.
 Five forms of shared mobility are identified: (i) Bikesharing; (ii) Carsharing; (iii)
Carpooling; (iv) Ridesharing; and (v) Ride-splitting.
 The value of transactions in shared mobility in Europe in 2015 has been estimated
at EUR 5.1 billion, and transport platforms’ revenue reached EUR 1.6 billion
(PwC, 2016). The value of transactions in 2025 could be above EUR 100 billion.
 Online platforms are the managers of the new data layer in transport and rely on the
existing infrastructure, but in new and creative ways. New players and new services
enrich the transport ecosystem, but at the same time, they have to ensure the
financial sustainability of the indispensable underlying infrastructure.
2.1 The concept of “sharing economy”
2.1.1 “Sharing” as a new socio-economic model
Sharing, defined as using an asset jointly, either at the same time or in turns, is as old as
humanity. However, over the last decade, a new socio-economic model has emerged around
the notion of sharing both assets and services. Different factors are fuelling the new model.
First, citizens, organisations and public authorities are increasingly aware of the negative
environmental effects of life-styles in industrialised societies. The accelerated acquisition of
goods is depleting natural resources, contaminating air, water and soil, and reinforcing climate
change. Transport represents almost a quarter of Europe's greenhouse gas emissions and is
the main cause of air pollution in cities (European Commission, 2016b p. 2).
Second, increasing economic hardship is generating a new demand for low-cost services. The
financial crisis of 2008 has reinforced this trend. Air transportation is a good example but also
the proliferation of low-cost coach services in Member States such as Germany and France
(Steer Davies Gleave, 2016).
Third, there is a general trend towards choosing access over ownership. Individual ownership
of assets is replaced with the possibility to use assets without owning them. For instance,
consumers are increasingly aware of the individual cost of owning assets in terms of
maintenance, repairs, insurance, storage, etc., as well as of the externalities in the form of
congestion, environmental damage, etc. The reduction in the rate of private vehicle ownership
in the most developed societies is a good example, as is the even more significant trend among
young people to either not obtain a driver’s licence or put off taking their licence exam (Beck,
2016).
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There is a consensus on the identification of technology, in particular Information and
Communication Technology (ICTs), as the new element that has made the emergence of the
new socio-economic model possible. Internet (“interconnected networks”) allows for seamless
and inexpensive communication through previously isolated telecommunications networks.
Smartphones allow universal communications as well as geo-localisation. Computers allow the
automatisation of procedures through the execution of algorithms. All these elements together
have dramatically reduced the transaction costs of sharing.
2.1.2 Terminology
Different terms are used for this new socio-economic model. “Sharing economy” is the most
popular term in the English language, but there are alternative terms such as “collaborative
consumption”, “collaborative economy” or “on-demand economy”. In other languages, terms
such as the French “économie collaborative” or the Spanish “economía colaborativa” are
popular.
Terminology reflects a debate on the concept. Authors and institutions that underline the peer-
to-peer element prefer the term “collaborative consumption” (Botsman, Rogers, 2010).
Other stakeholders that underline the interaction through platforms and the flexibility to provide
services on-demand seem to prefer the term “collaborative economy”. The Commission, for
instance, defines the “collaborative economy” as “a complex ecosystem of on-demand services
and temporary use of assets based on exchanges via online platforms” (European Commission,
2015a, p. 3).
Finally, the most common English term both in Europe and in the US is “sharing economy”.
This is the term used by the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Even if the word “sharing” might evoke non-
profit services, the most common understanding of the term does not exclude for-profit
services, or services other than peer-to-peer, or renting assets specifically acquired for this
purpose (and not only under-utilised assets) (Sundararajan, 2016).
All the key elements of the sharing economy are included in the definition used in resolutions
of the European Parliament: “a new socio-economic model that has taken off thanks to the
technological revolution, with the internet connecting people through online platforms on which
transactions involving goods and services can be conducted securely and transparently”
(European Parliament, 2015c, para. 110).
2.1.3 The leading role of online platforms
Online platforms are playing a leading role in the reduction of transaction costs (Parker, Van
Alstyne, Choudary, 2016). Platforms have been defined as an “undertaking operating in two
(or multi)-sided markets, which uses the internet to enable interactions between two or more
distinct but interdependent groups of users so as to generate value for at least one of the
groups.” (European Commission, 2015b, p. 5).
Online platforms concentrate the technological innovations for the interaction of the parties
interested in sharing goods and services. Parties interested in sharing identify themselves in
the platform, and they choose the goods and services to be shared, their location, the
conditions, etc. Platforms match owners of assets to be shared with users interested in making
use of them. Algorithms automatise the matching process (Evans, Schmalensee, 2016), which
takes place at a very low cost. The concentration in the platform of very large pools of providers
and consumers creates the fundamental indirect network effect (Evans, 2011) that ignites a
platform (Libert, Beck, Wind, 2016). Therefore, the cost of gathering information on the
availability and location of an asset or a service is dramatically reduced. Individuals can
Infrastructure funding challenges in the sharing economy
19
inexpensively communicate to agree on the sharing terms. Trust is made possible thanks to
the new cultural values facilitated by the social networks, as well as by specific instruments
provided by the platform such as identification of the users, evaluations, “likes”, artificial
intelligence tools that help to manage ratings and exclude fraudulent ratings, etc.
Lower transaction costs multiply the possibilities to share (Munger, 2015). Sharing is mostly
possible when the transaction cost is lower than the value obtained by the individuals involved
in a sharing transaction. Traditionally, sharing was limited to transactions with low transaction
costs (sharing with relatives or friends), or to high value transactions. Now that transaction
costs are very low, sharing is possible even when the value of the transaction is very low. It is
possible to share just for a few hours an under-used asset such as a hand-drill, just as it is
possible to share a bicycle, a car, a ride in a car, a yacht or even a jet (Goudin, 2016, p.10-
11).
The reduction of transaction costs has fuelled sharing, as it has reinforced the pre-existing
trends to diminish ownership of assets, lower the expense in services and decrease the
environmental footprint of our day-to-day activities, including transportation.
All these trends crystallised by the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, when the leading
platforms were established: Airbnb was created in San Francisco in November 2008, and Uber
was created in San Francisco in March 2009. BlaBlaCar was set up in Paris in 2006, but it was
only in 2009 when the app for mobile smartphones was launched. Transportation has been one
of the leading areas of the sharing economy from its inception.
2.1.4 Other elements
Sharing often has a connotation of a non-profit activity. Some original sharing economy
platforms did not foresee any payment among participants. This was the case of
homeexchange.com. In other cases, payments were reduced and were supposed to cover
expenses or share some common costs, but not to make a profit. This was the case of
Couchsurfing or BlaBlaCar.
However, the sharing economy cannot be limited to non-profit activities if we want to fully
include in our analysis the deep transformation that digitalisation is bringing to society. The
sharing economy has to include for-profit platforms, as well as service providers that aim to
have a profit.
Sharing economy platforms allow non-professionals to commercialise their assets and offer
services. Before the sharing economy, professionalisation had often been the result of high
transaction costs. Transaction costs explain the creation of the modern corporation (Coase,
1937). In the same line, standardisation of services, modern marketing, advertisement and
complex contracting were all introduced to decrease transaction costs in the industrial society.
All these activities require a minimum scale that goes beyond the reach of a non-professional
individual.
As online platforms reduce transaction costs, they allow non-professional individuals to provide
services and to commercialise services in competition with professionals and corporations.
Peer-to-peer interaction is one of the main novelties brought by the sharing economy.
However, as the sharing economy matures, many non-professional individuals are becoming
professional service providers. Furthermore, professional service providers are starting to make
use of platforms for the commercialisation of their services. As a result, it is increasingly difficult
to draw a borderline around the sharing economy. A very restrictive approach that limits the
concept of sharing economy to peer-to-peer services would not allow taking into consideration
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a significant portion of services provided through such popular sharing economy platforms such
as Uber or Airbnb. In this study, a wider interpretation of the term “sharing economy” is used,
which includes not only peer-to-peer services, but also professional services provided using
online platforms.
Sharing economy platforms allow sharing under-utilised assets. The reduction of transaction
costs allows commercialising the temporary use of assets despite the low value of such a use.
This possibility introduces a dramatic increase of efficiency, as a large percentage of goods
produced in industrialised societies remain idle with no use most of the time. Transport is a
prominent example of this: private cars remain idle 96% of the time (Bates, Leibling 2012, p.
23), creating a further cost for parking them when they are not being used.
However, the sharing economy allows the use of assets specifically acquired for the provision
of these kinds of services, and not only of under-utilised assets. This is the case for most bicycle
sharing systems, where local governments acquire and make bicycles available for use in turn
by citizens. It is also the case of carsharing schemes such as car2go, where cars are specifically
acquired and made available for use in turn by subscribers. In addition, Uber facilitates the
contracting of transport services with professional drivers that acquire their vehicle specifically
for the provision of the service. Consequently, for this study, the term “sharing economy” will
not be limited to the use of under-utilised assets.
2.2 Forms of shared mobility
What does the sharing economy mean in transport? As we have discussed, transport has been
one of the leading sectors in which this paradigm established itself. However, as with the
sharing economy in general, different definitions and opinions exist as to which activities can
be given this label. Excluding commercial activities does not seem productive as it would
exclude some of the most prominent developments such as free-floating carsharing and station
based bikesharing systems.
When using a broader definition of the sharing economy, two forms of sharing in transport can
be distinguished (Goudin, 2016). Firstly, hiring an asset (car- and bike- sharing schemes) and
secondly, hiring a transport service, meaning a car and someone to drive it (ridesharing
applications such as Uber or carpooling such as BlaBlaCar). The important thing is that both
phenomena (rental cars and carpooling communities) have existed well before the advent of
the sharing economy. The defining element is the use of digital applications to facilitate the
transaction. The availability of these technologies is the basis of the success of the most
prominent players such as Uber, BlaBlaCar and car2go.
Enabled by technology, several new transport modes are currently emerging that are neither
traditional private transport (private car, motorbike or bicycle) nor mass-transit services
(railways, coaches, urban buses, subway, etc.). These are referred to here as shared mobility
services or shared modes.
Naturally, the sector is in constant flux and apps are being developed that might call for an
extension of existing definitions. In this study, we will distinguish between the following five
forms of shared mobility services: (i) Bikesharing; (ii) Carsharing; (iii) Carpooling; (iv)
Ridesharing; and (v) Ride-splitting.
2.2.1 Bikesharing
Short term bike rental systems, usually based on docking stations, have been set up in an
increasing number of cities. They usually entail a registration and membership that is possible
for short as well as for long term periods. Increasingly, smartphone apps are used to guide
users to the next station. Furthermore, electric bikes are becoming more frequent. Different
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schemes exist in terms of installation and provision of the service, which is usually managed at
city-level. A common characteristic is that membership allows the free use of the bikes for the
first 30 minutes.
2.2.2 Carsharing
There are various forms that are referred to as carsharing. This study will focus on station
based and free-floating carsharing systems (and, by analogy, scootersharing systems) based
on memberships which can be found in an increasing number of cities. These systems provide
members with access to a fleet of automobiles that can be found throughout the cities. They
are rented for short periods, usually up to a day, and usually paid for per minute of use
facilitated by an app. In free-floating systems, cars can be picked up and dropped off at any
location in the area that the provider covers, whereas in station based systems cars are
returned to designated areas. Providers include city administrations or private companies such
as car2go, DriveNow or Enjoy.
2.2.3 Carpooling
Carpooling (also called ridesharing, particularly in the US) can be defined as the shared use of
a vehicle by a driver (usually the owner of the vehicle) and one or more passengers in order to
divide the cost of a trip made fully or partially together. Associated fees cover the price of
gasoline or other costs directly related to the trip.
The biggest provider for this “traditional form” of shared mobility in Europe is the French
company BlaBlaCar that links riders and drivers usually on medium to long distance trips.
2.2.4 Ridesharing
Platforms such as Uber have emerged as the most prominent facilitator of this service over the
recent years. A smartphone application links riders with drivers that are registered with the
community. Drivers and riders need to sign up for the service; however, drivers need to provide
additional documentation. Drivers can be non-commercially licensed or licensed professionals
(with Private Hire Vehicle – PHV - licenses). The driver’s and the passenger’s location is shared
via Global Positioning System (GPS), and payment is facilitated via credit card or PayPal using
the app. The app charges the customer a fare that is based on distance but also variable with
a surcharge during peak hours.
This type of “sharing” differs significantly from traditional carpooling. The key difference
between carpooling and ridesharing is that for ridesharing the driver would not usually have
done the trip anyway (Rayle et al., 2015).
As applications evolve, the distinctions among ridesharing, carpooling and taxi services are
starting to blur. Traditional taxis increasingly use their own apps as a dispatching service.
Additionally, a new and upcoming service that can be referred to as “ride-splitting” or “dynamic
carpooling” is offered by ridesharing providers. It essentially allows riders to “cab-pool” their
Uber/Lyft ride, by matching riders on similar routes dynamically, significantly cutting costs (see
below).
Ridesharing has characteristics of both systems. However, according to an empirical study in
the US it can be concluded that ridesharing is overall more similar to taxi services than to
carpooling1 (Shaheen et al., 2014, p.3).
1 Shaheen further suggests using the term “ride-sourcing” instead of “ridesharing” to differentiate commercial from
non-commercial ridesharing. In our study, however, we will only use the term “ridesharing”.
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2.2.5 Ride-splitting
A rather recent service has emerged namely, “ride-splitting” (or “dynamic carpooling”, as in
SUMC, 2016). Ridesharing operators and other players are offering a service for passengers on
similar routes to share rides with others, pairing them dynamically using the app (uberPOOL,
LyftLine). This further reduces costs.
2.3 The rising numbers of shared mobility
The sharing mobility sector has been in a state of constant flux over the last decades, making
it hard to find up-to-date and comparable data on its development. The available figures are
only indicative of the type of change seen in some EU Member States. Nevertheless, this may
help to identify the increasing trend in terms of both number of users and number of vehicles
available.
For example, a recent study (University of Leeds - Institute for Transport Studies, 2016, p. 34)
shows the growing numbers of carsharing customers and vehicles by selected European
countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland) between
2009 and the most recent year available (2012, 2014 or 2015).
Furthermore, if we look at source websites that host self-reported initiatives, numbers are self-
explanatory: none of them is exhaustive and they are mainly based on service registration, yet
they reveal a very diverse and rapidly changing environment:
 In 2015, the directory www.collaborativeconsumption.com/directory/ listed about 245
unique initiatives within the sharing economy worldwide in the transport field (Weston
et al., 2015). Less than two years later (March 2017) the directory lists 288 initiatives
worldwide (+16%) (Collaborative consumption, 2017).
 More than 700 companies are listed on the source website Mesh under the category
“mobility”, and they cover the different types of sharing mobility worldwide (Mesh,
2017).
 The global Share Guide by “The People Who Share” (The People Who Share, 2017) lists
about 800 different companies in the transport category. Thanks to their search engine
and filters, it is possible to see that the sharing economy in the mobility field is a
phenomenon that is present worldwide.
The value of transactions in shared mobility in Europe in 2015 was EUR 5.1 billion, and transport
platforms’ revenue was EUR 1.6 billion (PwC, 2016). For 2025, the same study has estimated
that the value of transactions could be above EUR 100 billion and the annual revenue of the
transport platforms might reach EUR 33 billion.2
2.4 Infrastructure and the new data layer
Different definitions of infrastructure exist. While some focus on “large, capital intensive natural
monopolies” others differentiate between “economic” (transport, utilities, communication,
energy) and “social” infrastructures (schools, healthcare, judicial infrastructure). This study will
focus mainly on transport infrastructure but using a very broad definition: It includes the
underlying physical infrastructure such as roads, tracks, stations, airports, etc., as well as
assets for the provision of transport services such as cars, buses, railways rolling stock, and all
the necessary support systems, staff, maintenance, etc.
With digitalisation, the role of infrastructures is evolving. The different infrastructures have
always co-existed next to each other; there was a telecommunications infrastructure next to
various transportation infrastructures (roads, tracks, airports, ports, etc.) which were parallel
2 These figures include carsharing, carpooling, ridesharing, ride-splitting and shared parking services. They do not
include bikesharing.
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to an electricity and a water infrastructure. Of course, there were links among these
infrastructures, inasmuch as the different users of the transportation infrastructures were
communicating via the telecommunications infrastructure and that the water infrastructure was
using electricity to function, for example.
However, with digitalisation, the situation radically changes: while the various above-
mentioned infrastructures continue to exist, and even exist next to each other, all these
infrastructures have been duplicated, or rather “mirrored” by and in a data or digital layer.
Indeed, information about both the state and the usage of the infrastructures is now being
generated thanks to sensors, Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFIDs), GPS, satellites, cameras
or smartphones, the latter by the users themselves. All this data has come to form a data layer,
which contains information about the infrastructures, their state and their usage.
As discussed earlier in the study, online platforms are emerging as leading players in the data
layer. In the mobility sector, entities such as BlaBlaCar or Uber operate solely in the data layer.
They do not own or manage roads or tracks, as they do not own vehicles. They merely manage
software (applications), data and algorithms. Airbnb, which does not own any buildings,
functions the same way. However, platforms, as managers of the data layer, are proving to be
the cornerstone of a new industrial organisation model.
Just as the internet allows the interconnection of telecommunications networks to provide
seamless communication solutions, online platforms allow different transport or energy services
providers to connect among themselves and with users, creating seamless mobility or energy
solutions. This is the power of the data layer.
The interesting part of this data layer in regards to infrastructure lies precisely in the fact that
this new data layer functions like an infrastructure. To recall, the traditional physical
infrastructures (such as roads, tracks, electricity and gas grids, water pipes) served as a
(physical) foundation on the basis of which services could be offered and developed. Now, there
is a new data layer above the traditional physical infrastructure and the service layer. This data
layer allows for new services and at the same time changes the nature of the traditional layers.
Indeed, all information related to infrastructures is brought together in this new data layer. It
is not really the data that are constitutive of the new infrastructure, but rather the algorithms
in the software that are making the links between the data.
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Figure 1: Layers in new industrial organisation model
Source: authors’ own elaboration
This is particularly relevant in transportation, as we will see later in this study. Traditionally,
each transport mode operated independently of each other. Fragmentation was the traditional
structure in some transport modes. This is definitely the case in road transportation, as millions
of independent vehicles use the infrastructure (private cars, taxis, urban buses, lorries,
coaches, etc.). Fragmentation is growing even in transport modes traditionally operated as a
centralised system: the operation of railway infrastructure, for example, was unbundled from
railway undertakings. Liberalisation is bringing a growing number of transport service providers
in railways, coaches, air transportation, etc. A similar trend can also be observed in electricity:
producers and consumers are highly fragmented and only connected through intermediaries
(retailers, traders). Thanks to digitalisation, information about production, consumption and
electricity transport becomes openly available, providing opportunities for smart energy
services.
We will come back to the consequences of digitalisation on transport later on. At this point, let
us briefly mention some examples of the consequences of digitalisation on other infrastructures,
namely electricity and telecommunications.
In the case of electricity, the newly emerging data layer contains information about production,
consumption, the state of the transmission grid, congestion in the grid, and more. Such
information, if properly analysed, does not only lead to more efficient use of the electricity
infrastructure or production facilities, but it can also lead to a better consumption of electricity,
something called demand-side management. The equivalent of a peer-to-peer service, in the
case of electricity, consists of peer-to-peer electricity trading, i.e., exchange between (self-
)producers and small consumers. Such peer-to-peer electricity exchanges create all kind of
problems for grid operations, including financial problems when it comes to investment in grid
development and maintenance. The sharing economy in the electricity sector therefore poses
a challenge for the grid as it increases volatility and grid instability, which in turn must be
handled by the grid operator at significant cost.
The most telling and most informative example of the implications for infrastructure funding of
newly emerging digital services can be found in the traditional telecommunications sector:
traditional telecommunications operators are providing connections to the internet, increasingly
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on a flat-rate basis. Once connected to the internet, individuals, households and firms are then
exchanging messages (WhatsApp) and making voice and video conversations (Skype) over the
internet, thus undermining the traditional business model of telecommunications operators,
which then lack the financial resources necessary to invest in their telecommunications
infrastructures. It is a typical example of when value-added moves either to the digital layer or
where the usage of the infrastructure simply becomes free.
Digitalisation allows a usage of the infrastructure without covering the corresponding costs in
the traditional way, simply because any value-added moves to the services offered thanks to
the data/digital layer are not necessarily reinvested in infrastructure.
In the continuation of this study, we will show how this plays out in the case of transport and
mobility and make some suggestions regarding how to develop a more sustainable system for
infrastructure funding.
2.5 Challenges of transport infrastructure financing
2.5.1 The relevance of transport infrastructure
Infrastructure is crucial for a national and European economy and society to function. It is also
crucial for the competitiveness of a national and European economy and all the firms operating
therein. Globally there is a rising need for investment in new infrastructure and in the renewal
of existing infrastructure in the years to come. In transport in particular, there is an urgent
need to invest in infrastructures in a context of complex dichotomies (UITP, 2015):
 Growing demand vs. limited capacity;
 Ageing vehicles vs. climate-oriented commitments;
 Outdated systems vs. new technologies.
Furthermore, in transport as well as in all network industries, there is a growing need for
integrating (and financing the integration of) technologies that take full advantage of the
increasing amount of data available thanks to ICTs.
While historically the financing and build-up of infrastructure has involved both private and
public funds, most infrastructures have eventually become state owned and public. However,
the last half of the 20th century has seen a move towards privatisation and new regulatory
approaches. Lastly, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as a way to leverage more
private funds for public infrastructure projects.
The supply of financing for infrastructure has been severely impacted by the financial crisis.
Shrinking national budgets increase the need to mobilise private funds for infrastructure
financing.
Countries across the EU and worldwide have adopted very different models for infrastructure
finance and the ratio between public and private funds differs significantly across countries. A
European Investment Bank (EIB) study found that in the EU the government sector finances
about one third of all economic infrastructure investments, whereas the rest is made up of
either corporate or project finance such as PPP (European Investment Bank, 2010, p. 27).
2.5.2 Transport infrastructure funding and transport policy in the EU
The EU has been supporting public infrastructure investments focussing especially on the
cohesion regions to foster economic development in the least developed regions. In light of the
recent financial and sovereign debt crisis, the EU has increased its efforts to counter the harmful
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effects of shrinking national budgets for infrastructure funding. Transport infrastructure takes
on an especially important role in this regard, as it contributes to the larger goals of the EU.
Transport was included among the Community’s common policies in 1957 to contribute to the
removal of the barriers between Member States and to favour the achievement of the freedom
of movement of goods, services, capital and peoples.
Today’s EU transport policy follows the overarching goal of the creation of a Single European
Transport Area (SETA) and the completion of the Internal Market for the transportation of goods
and passengers by removing barriers to transport operations and by promoting safe, efficient
and environmentally sound as well as user-friendly transportation services without curbing
mobility.3 The 2011 White Paper (art. 10) acknowledged that “infrastructure shapes mobility.
No major change in transport will be possible without the support of an adequate network and
more intelligence in using it. […] It has to be planned in a way that maximises positive impact
on economic growth and minimises negative impact on the environment.”
As a cross-border framework for the coherent development of infrastructures in Europe, the EU
has set up Trans-European Networks in the areas of transport (TEN-T), energy (TEN-E) and
telecommunications (e-TEN). The legally binding TEN-T guidelines (European Parliament and
the Council of the European Union, 2013c) outline the network to be completed in two stages:
 by 2030 - the core TEN-T network, comprising strategically the most important transport
connections from the point of view of the EU, and
 by 2050 - the comprehensive TEN-T network, ensuring connectivity to all the EU regions
at NUTS2 level.
The European Commission, together with Member States, estimated the full cost of completion
of the core TEN-T to be between EUR 700 billion and EUR 750 billion (Schade et al. 2015, p.
14).
The money to implement the TEN-T network comes partly from the EU, as well as from national
budgets and in some cases from private funds. The EU 2014-2020 budget offers a possibility
of a maximum of EUR 93.16 billion support for development of transport infrastructure through
various instruments, such as Connecting Europe Facility, Cohesion Fund4 and the European
Regional Development Fund5. However, these funds together with limited national budgets may
not be sufficient to reach the TEN-T policy goals within the desired time framework. The
European Fund for Strategic Investments, established in 2015 as part of the Juncker Plan,
intends to mobilise additional EUR 315 billion for infrastructure investment within three years.
Nevertheless, the scale of necessary investments in transport infrastructure to keep European
transport competitive is huge and it is essential to optimise the use of available financial
resources. In this context, any possible risks of reduction of funds envisaged for transport
infrastructures must be analysed.
3 2011 White Paper (COM(2011)144), accompanying Staff Working Document (SEC(2011)391), in line with the Single
Market Act II (COM(2012)573.
4 For the 2014-2020 period, the Cohesion Fund concerns Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (European Parliament
and the Council of the European Union, 2013c) and several funding opportunities (European Structural and
Investment Funds, Jaspers, Interreg, Urbact III, Innovative Actions in Sustainable Urban Development) especially
for urban mobility are provided (European Commission, 2017c).
5 The European Regional Development Fund focuses its investments on several key priority areas (thematic
concentration on: a) Innovation and research; b) The digital agenda; c) Support for small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs); d) The low-carbon economy. ERDF action is designed to reduce economic, environmental and
social problems in urban areas, with a special focus on sustainable urban development. (European Parliament and
the Council of the European Union, 2013b).
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3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHARING ECONOMY ON LONG
DISTANCE TRANSPORTATION
KEY FINDINGS
 Carpooling, as ignited by online platforms, empowers users to make a more efficient
use of the private vehicle, but at the same time, it is a substitute for the use of mass-
transit services, in particular railway and coach services, thereby reducing the
revenue of existing long distance transport providers.
 In the most advanced market, France, in 2015 carpooling reached an estimate of 6
billion passenger-km. This is more than 12% of the total passenger-km in long
distance domestic railways. In the near future, it could reach 14 billion passenger-km.
 In France, it has been estimated that carpooling passengers paid EUR 210 million to
drivers in 2015. This could increase to EUR 1,366 million in the near future.
 Substitution has reached significant volumes in the more advanced markets. It has been
estimated that SNCF lost 6% of the domestic long distance passengers in 2015.
Substitution is expected to grow further as carpooling matures and network effects
multiply, also on medium and low density routes.
 The volume of passengers detracted from mass-transit systems varies across countries
depending on several factors: (i) Maturity of the carpooling platforms and network
effect; (ii) Competitiveness of the road network (congestion, quality, tolls, bad weather);
(iii) Competitiveness of mass-transit services (price, trip duration, frequencies, etc.);
and (iv) Legal restrictions.
3.1 Introduction
The sharing economy is having a significant impact on long distance transportation, and in
particular on the funding of traditional mass-transit passenger transportation systems such as
railways and coaches.
Carpooling via online platforms is the shared mobility service that is having the deepest impact
on long distance transportation. Other shared mobility services such as carsharing or
ridesharing have a very limited usage outside of dense urban areas.
Carpooling has a long history. Informal sharing of private vehicles probably started as soon as
the first motor vehicles were available. Formal programmes to share trips were introduced in
the US in 1942 (Chan, Shaheen, 2012), as part of the war effort, to reduce consumption of
scarce resources (gasoline, rubber, etc.). Factories, churches or parent-teacher associations
were asked to form “car sharing club exchanges”. Similar initiatives spread around the US and
Europe (ATEMA/ADEME, 2010) as a response to the energy crisis of the 1970’s. As
environmental awareness increased in the late 1990s, carpooling programmes became popular
again. Carpooling was mostly restricted to specific communities (companies, universities, etc.)
as members of a community have common transportation needs and the necessary trust
amongst themselves. As a result, carpooling was mostly restricted to urban commutes.
Carpooling for long distance transportation was almost non-existent.
The critical mass necessary to fully exploit network effects in carpooling (GART/UTP, 2014, p.
32) has been reached thanks to recent technological advances. Online platforms using
smartphone apps benefit from the indirect network effects of multisided markets (markets
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where two or more distinct group interact through a third party). The more drivers and the
more passengers that join the app, the easier it is to find a match for each ride.
Trust among users of online platforms is decisive.6 Specific instruments have been introduced
in the apps to generate trust (declarative information, verifications, ratings, comments, etc.).
Carpooling platforms have achieved a high level of trust among users, often even higher than
trust in work colleagues and neighbours.7
Carpooling through online platforms has been particularly popular in Europe and can be deemed
a European success story. BlaBlaCar, a Paris based company, has 40 million members and more
than 25 million users worldwide. It claims to match 12 million trips per quarter, and to provide
access to 2 million trips at any given moment (BlaBlaCar, 2017). BlaBlaCar is the market leader
for carpooling in all the large European countries, with market shares above 90% in France,
Spain, Germany, Italy and Eastern Europe.8
Carpooling exists in the United States but is less popular than in Europe. Lower gasoline prices
may contribute to the difference. In the US companies like Zimride and Rideshark help connect
existing carpooling systems. Providing platforms for commuter ridesharing such as vRide have
proven more popular. BlaBlaCar has launched operations in Brazil, Mexico and India but it is
too early to determine the degree of success of these operations.
Carpooling brings evident benefits in terms of efficiency and cost-reduction to road
transportation. In France, for instance, while the average occupation rate of a private vehicle
is 2.2, occupation rates in carpooling are estimated at 3.4.9
Data on the impact of carpooling on collective transportation are scarce and fragmented. It is
not possible to provide a systematic European-wide perspective on the reduction of passengers
in collective transportation and on the impact on the funding of collective transportation at this
time. However, abundant information exists in the more mature area of the carpooling market:
France. Even if figures for France cannot be automatically extrapolated to the rest of Europe,
the trends in the most mature carpooling market in the world pave the way for the evolution
in the rest of Europe.
6 Sundararajan (2016, p. 60) the digitalisation of trust is discussed, and the concept of “trust infrastructure” is
presented.
7 In Mazzella, Sundararajan (2016), based on a survey of 18,289 BlaBlaCar users in 11 countries, it is stated that
88% of respondents had a very high or high trust in a member with a full profile in the platform. The same level of
trust in colleagues was declared by only 58% of respondents, and in neighbours - by 42% of participants of the
survey. Trust in family reached 94%.
8 BlaBlaCar grew in Germany through the acquisition in April 2015 of its local competitor, carpooling.com, which had
6 million registered users. BlaBlaCar grew in Eastern Europe through the acquisition in March 2015 of Budapest
based AutoHop and in January 2016 of Jizdomat, active in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
9 ADEME/6T (2015), based on a survey, identified the rate of 3.4 persons per vehicle, in line with a previous study
by MAIF which defined a 3.3 rate. BlaBlaCar has published a lower occupation rate of 2.8 (BlaBlaCar, 2016a). CGDD
has concluded that the occupation rate is even lower (1.4 passengers per car) but: (i) The driver is not included;
(ii) It includes the “empty runs” or rides where the driver published a ride but no passenger was matched to it; and
(iii) CGDD (and probably BlaBlaCar) does not take into consideration passengers traveling in the car who did not
sign through an online platform (relatives or friends of the driver). Taking into consideration these three variables,
occupation rates in all studies are similar.
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Box 1: Analysis of carpooling by public authorities in France
3.2 Description of carpooling
3.2.1 Profile of the carpooling users
In order to understand the dynamics of carpooling with relation to mass-transit transportation
modes, it is important to understand the profile of carpooling users and the incentives driving
the use of the service.
According to ADEME/6T (ADEME/6T, 2015), BlaBlaCar users in France are younger than the
average population. Passengers tend to be younger (average 34) than drivers (average 37),
when the average age in France is 40. In any case, the average age of the users is growing as
the service matures.10 Carpooling users tend to be better educated than the average (both
drivers and passengers),11 and they tend to be single and without children (ADEME/IPSOS,
2013).
Significant differences have been found in the profiles of passengers and drivers. Passengers
are often students and employees with a low salary. Drivers tend to be young professionals
with salaries below the average.12 Passengers tend to concentrate in urban areas. Drivers, on
the contrary, have a more diverse geographical background. Passengers have a higher use of
collective transportation (including shared-bicycle schemes) than the average citizen. The
majority of drivers own a vehicle whereas 52% of passengers do not own a car, particularly
younger passengers.
10 According to information made public by BlaBlaCar, the average age of newcomers to the platform in 2010 was 29,
while in 2015 it was 34. The fastest growing group in 2015 was that of users above 60 (BlaBlaCar, 2016b).
11 47% of users have a college degree, against 13% of the total population. Similar results can be found in Shaheen
et al. (2016).
12 These figures are confirmed in Shaheen et al. (2016).
French authorities have closely followed the evolution of carpooling in France. The French
Environment and Energy Management Agency (ADEME - Agence de l'Environnement et de
la Maîtrise de l'Énergie) commissioned a preliminary study in 2010 for the identification of
the trends in carpooling (ATEMA/ADEME, 2010). The French Association of Transport
Authorities (GART - Groupement des Autorités Responsables de Transport), together with
the French Union for Public Transport (UTP - Union des Transports Publics et Ferroviaires)
commissioned a study in 2014 on the impact of carpooling in collective transportation. One
of the conclusions of the study was the need to identify the drivers behind the use of
carpooling. An in-depth survey was then commissioned and published in 2015 (ADEME/6T,
2015). Building on this survey and using web-crawling techniques, the French General
Commission for Sustainable Development (CGDD - Commissariat Général au
Développement Durable) published a study in 2016 with quantitative data on the volumes
of carpooling services and the potential for growth in the future (CGDD, 2016).
This public effort has been complemented with studies from private actors. Two studies are
particularly interesting. An insurance company, MAIF, published an analysis of carpooling
practices in 2009. A group of researchers (Shaheen et al., 2016) conducted a large survey
among BlaBlaCar users with the support of the online platform.
This coordinated effort provides a rich amount of data for the analysis of the impact of
shared mobility in the funding of mass-transit in France. This section of the study builds on
the data published by French public authorities and private actors for the French market.
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3.2.2 Reasons to use carpooling
Lower prices are the main driver for the growth of carpooling: 69% of carpooling users chose
the service for its price, 12% for the flexibility in the schedule, 7% for the duration of the trip
and 7% for the social experience (ADEME/6T, 2015). This finding is consistent across all
surveys.13
Convenience is also important. According to ADEME/6T (2015), the time of departure is the
main factor when choosing one driver over another (89%), even more than the price (79%) or
the type of vehicle (22%). In Shaheen et al. (2016), saving time is identified as one of the
main reasons passengers use the service. However, availability of the service diverges very
significantly among routes. Dense routes across large cities ensure a wide range of options,
often more options than mass-transit (night services, strikes, cross-border services).14 Routes
connecting rural areas, on the contrary, provide fewer options or even no option at all. The day
of the week is also relevant. It has been confirmed in CGDD (2016) that carpooling services
tend to be concentrated over Fridays and Sundays and in general on holiday periods.
As the number of users increases, carpooling becomes more attractive. On denser routes, the
occupation rate of a car is higher than on other routes (CGDD, 2016, p. 6). The higher the
occupation rate of a car, the lower the price of the service, as costs can be distributed among
a larger pool of passengers. In parallel, as the number of drivers on a specific route increases,
there are more departure time options. Since low prices and flexibility in departure times are
the key parameters to use carpooling, as the number of users increases, the service improves,
generating a further increase in the number of users. Such a virtuous cycle is the defining trait
of the network effect (Libert et al., 2016).
3.2.3 How carpooling is used
Pricing is the key driver of carpooling success. Carpooling prices are clearly below railway prices
(particularly high-speed services) and most of the times they are below coach service prices
(see section 3.3).
The leading carpooling platform, BlaBlaCar, recommends a price by dividing the cost of petrol
and tolls in three. Prices rarely diverge substantially from this reference. In France, it has been
identified that the average price per passenger is EUR 0.06 per kilometre (CGDD, 2016, p. 5).
This price will be different in other countries as the price of petrol and tolls are different. A
commission of around 18% of the price is charged by BlaBlaCar to passengers.
There are several reasons for the low prices of carpooling services:
 Drivers tend to share only variable costs (petrol and tolls) with passengers, and fixed
costs, which amount to 2/3 of the total cost,15 are often ignored. This is possible because
the driver is travelling to the destination, and not merely transporting third parties to
the destination;
 National regulation on carpooling often introduces a limit on fees that can be charged,
as the provision of the service for a profit is often prohibited (see section 3.4);
 In comparison to mass-transit services, carpooling has some regulatory advantages:
- no taxes are paid by the driver when charging passengers,
- no time-limitations are imposed on drivers,
13 In MAIF (2009), 70% of users used the service for economic reasons, but more altruistic reasons were also
considered: protection of the environment (12%) or providing a service (4%). In Shaheen et al. 2016, saving
money is also identified as the main reason to use the service, particularly among drivers with a low income. In
Fondazione per lo sviluppo sostenibile (2016) 65.8% of the answers to the survey refer to economic reasons;
environmental reasons rank second (45.2%).
14 GART/UTP (2014) identified carpooling as stronger when the railway service is weaker.
15 See calculation in GART/UTP (2014, p. 42).
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- in some countries, no tolls are imposed for the use of roads, while the main cost
borne by railway undertakings is the access charge for the use of the railway
infrastructure,
- no Public Service Obligations (PSO) are imposed, etc.
Therefore, even if private vehicles are not more efficient than railways or coaches, they can
charge lower prices to transport passengers, thus affecting said passengers’ choice of transport
mode.
The low price of the carpooling service might explain some usage patterns. Drivers are not
usually ready to significantly detour from their prearranged route to pick-up or drop-off
passengers.16 Stable meeting points are emerging as “hubs”,17 and passengers mostly rely on
mass-transit transportation to reach the “hub”.18 As a consequence, carpooling is more
successful in dense areas where passengers can easily reach the “hub” either on public
transportation or on foot. This is a good example of the complementarity between carpooling
and mass-transit transportation. This might be another reason why carpooling in the US is not
as popular as in Europe.
Carpooling has started to influence decisions regarding car ownership. In ADEME/6T (2015),
3% of carpooling users declared that they had renounced owning a car, and 11% of users
declare that they delayed acquiring a car either because they postponed the procurement of a
driver’s license (7%) or the acquisition of the car itself (4%). As passengers have more
alternatives, they do not need to own a car.
On the contrary, 3% of users declared that carpooling had made them decide not to renounce
their car (ADEME/6T, 2015, p. 65). Accordingly, CGDD (2016) has identified that carpooling
does actually increase the number of private vehicle trips. For each carpooling trip, there is a
7% increase in the use of the private vehicle, which in 2015 in France amounted to 0.56 million
new trips.19
3.2.4 Calculating the size and potential growth of carpooling in the most mature
market: the case of France
Carpooling has reached a significant portion of the overall long distance transportation market
in the more mature markets. French data are particularly relevant as it is the most mature
carpooling market. According to CGDD (2016), a total of 8 million carpooling trips were made
in 2015.20
16 According to the survey conducted in ADEME/6T (2015), 36% of drivers did not detour at all, 35% made a detour
of less than 2km, 38% a detour of between 2km and 5 km and 27% a detour of more than 5 km.
17 Carpooling “hubs” are emerging in European cities. In France, the most common locations for pick-up are train
stations (36% of cases) and car parks in specific points such as commercial areas (29%). in only 6% of cases pick-
up takes place at the driver’s or passenger’s location (ADEME/6T 2015, p. 64. See GART/UTP 2014, p. 57).
18 44% of passengers reach the meeting point in collective transportation modes, 22% have been transported by car
by a third person, 20% have reached the meeting point on foot, 6% have driven their own car to the meeting point,
and only 2% have been picked-up by the driver in their own location (ADEME/6T 2015, p. 64).
19 For each carpooling trip, there is an increase of 0.34 vehicles on the road (the number of drivers that make the trip
due to the cost reduction made possible by carpooling). At the same time, there is a parallel reduction of 0.16 x
number of passengers in the car, assuming that such passengers would use their own car. As the number of
passengers (other than the driver) is an average of 1.7, the reduction of vehicles is of 0.27 per trip. As a result,
each carpooling trip generates an increase of 7% in the use of private vehicles.
20 This figure is coherent with figures in other studies such as UIC (2016) and GART/UTP (2014). In UIC (2016) the
number of carpooling trips in 2015 was estimated to be 7 million (p. 55). In GART/UTP (2014), based on public
statements by BlaBlaCar, the number of passengers transported in 2013 was estimated to be around 1% of the
total number of long distance passengers and 5% of the trips in public land transportation modes (train, coach and
carpooling).
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In economic terms, it can be estimated that the fees paid by carpooling passengers to drivers
in France, in 2015, amounted to EUR 210 million.21
Table 1: Carpooling in France 2015
ITEM ESTIMATE
Number of trips offered 8 million
Number of seats offered by trip (not including driver) 2.7
Number of seats offered 21.6 million
Occupancy rate 52%
Number of passengers transported 11 million
Average distance per trip 320 km
Number of passenger-km (not including driver) 3.5 billion
Number of passengers (including driver) 19 million
Number of passenger-km (including driver) 6 billion
Average price per km EUR 0.06
Total fees paid by passengers to drivers EUR 210 million
Source: CGDD (2016, p. 5), and extrapolation from CGDD data.
To put it into perspective, 6 billion passenger-km represent 2.72% of the total passenger-km
in domestic long distance transportation in France in 2015, and more than 12% of the
passenger-km of long distance railway transportation.
Table 2: Long distance passenger-km per mode in France
MODE BILLION OFPASSENGER-KM %
Private car: 158 71.98%
Of which total carpooling users 6 2.72%
Of which carpooling passengers 3.5 1.59%
Of which carpooling drivers 2.5 1.13%
Train 49 22.32%
Airplane 13 5.92%
All 219.5 100%
Source: CGDD (2016, p. 5)
21 This is the result of multiplying the 3.5 billion passenger-km by the average price per km (EUR 0.06)
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CGDD (2016) estimates state that carpooling has a significant potential for growth even in the
most mature markets, i.e. France. Carpooling could grow from 3.5 billion passenger-km in 2015
to a range of between 5.9 and 8.2 billion passenger-km in the near future.22 This would amount
to annual payments of between EUR 354 million and EUR 1,366 million. These figures take into
consideration only the number of passengers, not drivers. If drivers are included, the total
number of passenger-km could reach 14 billion passenger-km.
There is evidence that carpooling creates new demand. In ADEME/6T (2016), 56% of users
affirm that without carpooling, they would travel less (p. 66). This is particularly the case among
passengers (62%), but also, even at a smaller magnitude, among drivers (21%). Carpooling
users confirm that if carpooling were not available, they would not have made their last trip:
12% of passengers and 8% of drivers (p. 69).23
CGDD (2016) has estimated that the increase in the number of road trips due to carpooling in
France in 2015 was of 0.4 billion vehicle-km. This is significant, but it represents only a small
fraction of the total number of passengers using carpooling.
3.2.5 Trends and potential growth of carpooling in less mature markets
Carpooling is growing all around Europe. The increasing relevance of carpooling in terms of
number of users, number of passenger-km and payments that we identified in France can serve
as a lesson for the not-yet-mature (in terms of carpooling presence) markets in the rest of
Europe.
In Europe, several start-ups entered the carpooling market in the past few years. In different
cases, we can identify local initiatives that target commuter routes and specific groups and
companies. For example, the five “champion cities” (Craiova - Romania, Edinburgh - United
Kingdom, Leuven – Belgium, Perugia - Italy, Toulouse - France) that were part of the CHUMS
project had existing carpooling systems, at various stages of maturity. The goal of the project
was to “attract carpoolers, match them and retain them”, to keep the numbers rising, and to
develop and transfer this proven practice to generate a core sustainable market for carpooling
across Europe (CHUMS, 2016). It is interesting to note that the frontrunner BlaBlaCar is
constantly consolidating its leadership position by buying up competitors in different countries.
In 2012, BlaBlaCar bought Superdojazd, and opened in Poland. In 2015, BlaBlaCar expanded
further by teaming up with Mitfahrgelegenheit in Germany and Hungary-based AutoHop in
Hungary, Croatia, Serbia and Romania. The following year, BlaBlaCar purchased Jizdomat and
expanded to the Czech Republic and Slovakia (BlaBlaCar, 2017).
The success of carpooling depends on multiple factors, such as:
 the competitiveness of collective transportation in terms of price and duration of the
journey,
 the competitiveness of road transportation due to the existence of tolls, congestion, etc.,
 cultural reasons that might limit the growth of the service in some countries (i.e. sharing
a small closed environment with a stranger might put some travellers off, particularly in
some countries). For instance, carpooling seems to have more limited success in the
UK, where roads are congested, railways quite efficient and travellers seem to be more
averse to sharing space with strangers.
22 This estimation could be conservative, as it merely takes into consideration three parameters: (i) Demographic
evolution, as current users tend to be younger than average; (ii) Geographic expansion of the service, as it is
currently concentrated in dense routes; and (iii) Expected increase in train prices. It does not take into consideration
the power of indirect network effects. As a matter of fact, CGDD (2016) study confirms that, as the number of
active users on a specific route grows, the average number of “empty runs” diminishes and the occupation rate
grows.
23 Similar results in Shaheen et al (2016, p. 10).
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3.3 Substitution of other transport modes
The large volume of passenger-km is, for the most part, not the result of new demand, or the
shift from the use of private vehicles to carpooling. In fact, most carpooling passengers and
even some carpooling drivers were previously traveling by train or coach.
Academic literature and some empirical research underline the strong competition between
carpooling and mass-transit transportation, both for commuting and for long distance trips
(Godillon, 2016, Minett, Pearce 2011, and TCRP, 2012).
Different studies demonstrate that carpooling is competitive with mass-transit transportation
in terms of both price and duration of the trip. A recent study by UIC 2016 includes comparative
tables on the substitutability of the different long distance transport modes, including carpooling
(see below).
Table 3: Paris-Lille: modal chain, total time and cost
Source: UIC (2016, p. 219)
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Table 4: Barcelona-Alicante: modal chain, total time and cost
Source: UIC (2016, p. 231)
Table 5: Paris-Frankfurt: modal chain, total time and cost
Source: UIC (2016, p. 233)
In the UIC 2016 study, it is identified that railway transportation is the most convenient mode
in terms of duration of the trip, particularly when a high speed service is available (with the
exception of air transportation when a high speed railway service is not provided on long
routes). However, both railways and air transportation are expensive (particularly when railway
transportation is served with high-speed services). On the contrary, carpooling is the cheapest
option and it is still convenient in terms of duration of the trip.
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Thus, direct competition exists between carpooling and coach services, with a competitive
advantage for carpooling in terms of both pricing and duration of the trip. Carpooling offers an
attractive substitute to railway transportation when passengers want to reduce costs and are
ready to compromise regarding the duration of the trip.24
Substitutability is also confirmed by surveys among carpooling users. They show that carpooling
users would increase the use of collective transportation if carpooling were not available.
According to the survey in ADEME/6T (2015), this is the case for both passengers (72%) and
drivers (26%).25 In ADEME/6T (2015), the type of collective transport mode that would be used
is even distinguished.
Table 6: Transport mode that would have been used in the last trip if carpooling were
not available
MODE DRIVER PASSENGER
Private vehicle 67% 16%
Train 14% 42%
High Speed Train 10% 27%
Coach 1% 2%
Airplane 1% 1%
No trip 8% 12%
Source: ADEME/6T (2015, p. 69)
Related, the survey in Shaheen et al. (2016) confirmed that for low-income users, the main
alternative to carpooling is collective transportation.
There is even some quantitative analysis on the impact of carpooling services in mass-transit
transportation in France. An estimate is provided in CGDD (2016). According to this study, the
number of passenger-km travelled by train would have been 52.3 billion instead of 49.2 billion
if carpooling had not been available. That is a reduction of 3.1 billion passenger-km, around
6% of the actual 49 billion train passenger-km in France in 2015.
In ADEME/6T (2015), it is advanced that each vehicle-km travelled by carpooling reduced the
use of train by two passenger-km (ADEME/6T, 2015, p.74). If the total number of vehicle-km
in carpooling is estimated to be 2.5 billion in 2015,26 this means that the total number of
passenger-km travelled by train would have been reduced by 5 billion, around 10% of the
number of passenger-km in 2015.
24 This seems to be the case in France, where coach services have traditionally been restricted to routes served by
railway services and only recently, coach services have been launched. As the operation of a high-speed service
often involved the reduction or elimination of parallel conventional services, at a lower price, on the same route,
carpooling provides a much cheaper alternative to railway services. As a consequence, it has been identified
(ADEME/6T, 2015) that carpooling services have a larger market share when the route is served by a high speed
service.
25 These figures are confirmed in the survey in Shaheen et al (2016, p. 12), as 65% of passengers would use collective
transportation, while 88% of drivers would use a personal car.
26 2.5 billion vehicle-km is the result of multiplying 8 million annual trips by 320, the number of average km in
carpooling trips.
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However, the impact of carpooling on mass-transit depends on several factors, which are
unevenly distributed across European countries.
First, carpooling reinforces the competitiveness of road transportation against railway
transportation (which is a negative trend from the point of view of the EU transport policy goal
to increase market share of more environmentally friendly modes of transport).
Competitiveness depends on various parameters:
 Quality of the road network: the better the road network, the larger the impact on
railways;
 Congestion: countries where roads are already congested will probably see a smaller
growth of carpooling. This could be the case of the United Kingdom, where the sharing
economy is overall more developed, but carpooling is not as popular as in other
European countries; and
 Existence of tolls: roads are more competitive where no tolls are charged for the use of
the road. However, where tolls are charged, carpooling allows distributing such fixed
costs among the users, reducing individual cost and reinforcing the competitiveness of
road transportation.
If roads face objective limitations (limited network, congestion, bad weather, etc.) the role of
carpooling will be more limited, and the impact on railway funding will be smaller. On the
contrary, in countries with a good road network, no significant congestion and no other
objective limitation to the use of private cars, the impact on the funding of the railway system
will be more significant.
The impact of carpooling on railways seems to diminish as distance increases in such a way
that on very long distances (above 500 km) it is more limited than on medium distances
(ADEME/6T, 2015, p. 61). The comfort of the railway services against private vehicles (more
space, possibility to walk around the train, on-board services, etc.) seems to be the explanation.
This fact also explains why carpooling has a limited effect on air transportation, as flights usually
cover greater distances, particularly those above 500 km.
Second, carpooling reinforces the competitiveness of private vehicle transportation against
coach transportation. Even if both transport modes use roads, carpooling is modifying the
traditional equilibrium between private vehicles and coaches. As carpooling drivers merely
require payments to cover variable costs (gasoline and tolls) but no fixed costs (acquisition of
the vehicle, insurance, repair, taxes, etc.), the price for carpooling passengers is lower, and in
some cases much lower, than coach services. As a consequence, the competitiveness of private
vehicles against coaches is reinforced. The impact of carpooling on coach companies’ revenues
is expected to be particularly relevant. This impact is already felt in countries with a strong
coach industry, such as Spain. In countries where coach services have been liberalised only
recently (Germany and France) or where it has never really taken off (Italy), carpooling might
just impede the growth of the industry to the levels that could be expected if carpooling had
not existed.
Third, mass-transit services previously insulated from effective competition are more prone to
suffer passenger reduction. This is the case of high-speed railway services in France. They had
no mass-transit cheap alternative (coaches or traditional railway services), so the appearance
of a cheaper alternative is having a strong impact on revenue. Spain is the counter-example.
As high-speed railway services always had competition from coach services, carpooling is not
perceived as competition for the service and no relevant impact on the revenue of the service
has been identified.
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The existing evidence shows that carpooling is substituting the use of mass-transit
transportation. This substitution has reached significant volumes in more mature markets and
can be expected to grow further as carpooling matures and network effects multiply, also on
medium and low-density routes.
3.4 Legal restrictions to carpooling
The reduction of the number of passengers in mass-transportation has a direct financial
consequence, as payment for the service by passengers is the main source of revenue for long
distance mass-transportation service providers in Europe (see section 5.2).
This explains why some European countries prohibit the provision of transportation services to
private citizens without a license. A distinction is often drawn between private and public
transportation. Private transportation is allowed, while public transportation is prohibited. The
key parameter to differentiate private and public transport tends to be whether the driver
makes a profit or merely covers costs. Sometimes a further requirement is introduced, such as
a limitation to provide the service to a closely related individual.
Many European countries have prohibited the provision of transportation services by individuals
without a license, which is the basis for many shared transport applications.
 In France, carpooling is allowed as long as the driver makes the trip for himself and
charges no fee, but merely divides the costs of the trip. (Article L. 3131-1 Loi de
transition énergétique of 2015). The reference for costs is the annual publication by the
tax authorities of the maximum deduction in the income tax for the use of the private
vehicle. These figures take into consideration both fixed (acquisition of the car,
insurance and repairs) and variable (petrol) costs with the exception of tolls and parking.
They are different according to the power of the vehicle and the kilometres claimed by
the taxpayer. As a reference, in 2015, for a car with a tax horsepower of six travelling
10,000 km per year, the cost per km was EUR 0.42, so the maximum payment for the
average trip of 320 km would be EUR 134.4. This is clearly below the EUR 0.06 per km
that are the average price charged by carpooling drivers to each passenger.
 In Spain, carpooling is only allowed if the passenger is closely related to the driver and
only costs are shared. (Act 31/1987 on land transportation). Commercial Court nº2 in
Madrid, ruled on February 3rd, 2017 that transport services mediated by BlaBlaCar are
private services that can be provided with no license as the price is below EUR 0.19, the
legal reference to reimburse expenses to civil servants when traveling with their own
car.
 In Italy, the reform of the traffic law (Codice della Strada) is under discussion. The
proposal that is now at the Senate (DDL 1638 Art. 2.12) calls for the introduction of the
definition of carpooling, which is a transport service that:
 does not generate profit;
 is based on the principle of sharing the use of a vehicle by two or more persons
that have to travel (part of) the same itinerary; and
 puts travellers in contact thanks to public or private dedicated intermediaries,
which may also be online instruments.
 Germany had once outlawed carpooling, long before online platforms came about. The
law was passed to protect the business of traditional taxi companies. The ban was
revoked by a constitutional court decision in 1964 clarifying that carpooling is legal when
the costs charged do not exceed the costs of operation of the trip (BVerfG, 07.04.1964
- 1 BvL 12/63). Accordingly, Germany’s Passenger Transport Act
(Personenbeförderungsgesetz) does not apply to carsharing (§ 1 Abs. 2 Satz 1 Nr. 1
PBefG).
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4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHARING ECONOMY ON
URBAN TRANSPORTATION
KEY FINDINGS
 Urban transportation is becoming more complex as shared mobility emerges as a new
category of services between the private car and mass-transit services.
 Europe is the world leader in bikesharing and carsharing. However, Europe is lagging
behind the US and China in the penetration of more sophisticated, platform based,
ridesharing and ride-splitting services.
 As a reference, carsharing revenue in Europe was estimated to be around EUR
230 million in 2015. There is no public information on total revenue in Europe
regarding bikesharing, ridesharing and ride-splitting.
 As shared mobility grows, different studies show that it is not substituting mass-
transit. Substitutability is rather low for carsharing and ridesharing services. It is more
relevant for bikesharing and potentially for ride-splitting. Existing volumes for all shared
mobility options are rather low and they are not in the position to substitute a substantial
share of the services provided by mass-transit.
 Shared mobility solutions, particularly carsharing and ridesharing, seem to substitute
private car usage and ownership.
 Overall, a more sophisticated understanding of the situation is emerging: shared
mobility might be a key complement to mass-transit. Even if the volumes are not
very large, shared mobility might reinforce the weak points of mass-transit (low-density
areas, night services, specific needs) in a way that makes the combined provision of
both mass-transit and shared mobility services a fully viable alternative to private car
ownership.
 Mobility as a Service (the combined commercialisation of mass-transit and shared
mobility solutions by a single entity, under a single price) might be the framework under
which the substitution of the private vehicle becomes a reality.
4.1 Introduction
Urban transportation is a complex system with an increasing number of competing transport
modes and with very different patterns across cities in the use of private vehicles, mass-transit,
and new shared mobility solutions. However, common problems exist, at different degrees, in
all urban areas. Transport creates external costs such as congestion, environmental problems
(air quality, noise, CO2, etc.) and generates accidents.
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Table 7: Estimated annual external costs of current urban transport system in EU27
INDICATOR ESTIMATED COST
Congestion ~ EUR 80 billion
Air Quality ~ EUR 20 billion
Accidents ~ EUR 80 billion
Noise ~ EUR 40 billion
CO2 ~ EUR 7 billion
Total external costs ~ EUR 230 billion
Source: European Commission/COWI (2013, p. 7)
Shared mobility is transforming urban transportation. New transport modes generate
alternatives to traditional transport modes. Innovation is not limited to creating new transport
modes. Technology and new business models driven by technology are transforming the way
passengers use existing transport modes. Passengers can increasingly combine different
transport modes. They are starting to perceive mobility like a service (see section 4.4).
Europe is leading in some of the shared mobility services at the urban level. Bikesharing started
in Europe and Europe has the largest number of bikesharing systems in the world. Europe is
also leading in carsharing. European car manufacturers have the largest number of vehicles
under carsharing schemes.
However, Europe is lagging behind in the more sophisticated ridesharing and ride-splitting
solutions. These solutions require more advanced technology and a leading role by an online
platform with the financial resources to reach the critical mass necessary to reap the benefits
of indirect network effects.
Uber, US based, is the leading ridesharing platform worldwide and in Europe. Ridesharing is
less developed in Europe than in the US or China, due mostly to regulatory restrictions and the
fragmentation of the European market.
The concept of Mobility as a Service also originated in Europe. Europe has the necessary tools
to make it a success: powerful mass-transit systems, a rich ecosystem of shared mobility
systems and leading companies investing in new mobility solutions.
4.2 Description of shared urban mobility
4.2.1 Bikesharing
The first bikesharing system was launched in Amsterdam in 1965, even though it failed shortly
after. First generation systems merely provided free-to-use bicycles and were prone to
vandalism, theft, etc. Second-generation systems started to be more stable as they introduced
some controls (coin-operated systems). However, it was only the third-generation systems that
became a success due to the use of IT-based solutions: personal smart cards, stations with
terminals and customer information, and flexible charging systems. The bikesharing system
launched in Lyon (France) in 2005 was the leader of this new generation (DeMaio, 2009).
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Different models have evolved around the world. Bikesharing systems can be managed by:
 Local public authorities (i.e. in the Irish cities of Cork, Galway, Limerick, the National
Transport Authority offers the service);
 Traditional transport organisations (i.e. DB Rent in Germany, OV-Fiets/NS in the
Netherlands);
 Non-profit organisations; and
 Profit-oriented private companies (i.e. JCDecaux that started from France and expanded
all over the world by partnering with local advertising operators). This is the most
common alternative, and companies usually operate in several cities (i.e. Bicincittà
operates in 115 Italian municipalities with a fleet of 6,241 bikes and 1,418 stations).
These models are constantly evolving, and recently different public-private partnerships have
been established (i.e. BikeMi in the city of Milan, Bicing in Barcelona, and Stockholm City Bikes
in Stockholm are all owned by the respective municipality and the service is operated by the
private company ClearChannel).
Three direct sources of funding can be identified for bikesharing systems: (i) Public subsidies;
(ii) Fares collected from users; and (iii) Revenue from advertisement. Advertising companies
are managing a large number of systems: in Dublin (Ireland), JCDecaux is managing the system
in exchange for the use of 72 advertising spaces for a period of fifteen years (valued at EUR 54
million) (Murphy, Usher, 2015).
The main advantages of bikesharing systems are flexibility in implementation, use and
development, adaptability, increased physical activity (i.e. tackling the obesity challenge among
urban societies), decreased congestion, emissions and noise, decreased fuel consumption and
optimisation of individual spending.
Figures in 2016 show that Europe is leading in bikesharing (44% of existing bikesharing systems
are in Europe, 42% in Asia and 10% in North America). China is the leading country with 37%
of systems deployed there (Metrobike, 2017). Bikesharing systems have reached a significant
size in many European cities in terms of registered users and bicycles available, the leader of
which is Paris (Nair et al., 2013).
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Figure 2: Size of bikesharing, selected cities
Source: Fishman (2016)
Bikesharing is mostly used by the young population, and more by males than by females. It is
more popular among the highly educated population, independent of income level. It is used
for commuting to educational and work centres, as well as for recreational purposes,
particularly at night time, as mass-transit services are reduced. (Shaheen, Martin, 2015).
Bikesharing is a good tool to increase the use of the private bicycle. As more citizens see other
people using the bicycle, they get more familiar with it and they give it a try. As they incorporate
the shared bicycle into their daily routines, they often decide to acquire and use a bicycle to
move around the city. This means that, at least during the initial period, bike sharing can serve
as a promoter for urban bike use.
Moreover, the data collected on bikesharing users can be used by transport planners at a whole
city scale. There are already interesting experiences in this regard in cities such as Minneapolis,
Zurich, Madrid, etc. in terms of GPS tracking, creation of apps to share information, tracking of
journey data, etc. (Romanillos et al., 2016).
Both bikesharing and the private bicycle face objective limitations in terms of volume of use.
Geography (large distances, hills), weather and culture impose limits to the use of the bicycle
as a transport mode. Some of these impediments, however, may be overcome by the switch
to electric bikes/electric bikesharing systems, which are currently evolving. For instance, the
city of Madrid has completely switched to electric bikes. In Italy, according to the data provided
by Bicincittà (operator active in 98 locations in Italy), 16% of their systems provide e-bikes,
21% are mixed systems with both traditional and e-bikes and 62% provide only traditional
bikes. The switch from traditional to electric bike sharing systems may have the downside of
higher costs for maintenance and in cases of vandalism. Therefore, case-by-case evaluation on
the possibility to offer electric bikesharing is taken by bikesharing suppliers, who tend to prefer
to apply electric bikes mainly where it is necessary for geographical reasons.
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Box 2: Bikesharing in Paris
4.2.2 Carsharing
Carsharing has evolved over time. Originally, carsharing systems were structured as “roundtrip
systems” also called “station based systems”. Vehicles were stored in a number of stations
across town, and users had to start and terminate their trips in the same station. Vehicles were
typically owned by the system managers.
As with other shared mobility modes, carsharing is increasing in relevance as technology
provides more flexibility and so called “one-way” or “free-float” systems are introduced. In one-
way systems, trips do not have to begin and end at the same point, as users can leave the
vehicle either at another station or in any parking space within a designated area (metropolitan
area, city or part of the city). Vehicles are typically owned by the system managers, often a car
manufacturer. There are also scootersharing systems, i.e. the systems managed in Italy by
Enjoy and Zig Zag (Fondazione per lo sviluppo sostenibile, 2016, p. 58).
European car manufacturers have been very active in the provision of these systems. car2go,
owned by Daimler AG, is the largest carsharing manager in the world. In October 2016, it
operated systems in 25 cities, with 14,000 vehicles and a total of 2 million registered users.
Vélib, the bikesharing system in Paris, has a fleet of close to 20,000 bicycles spread around
1,606 stations, one every 300 meters, almost all of them inside the Boulevard
périphérique (35 km freeway around the urban core of the city).
The system is operated under a concession of the city government granted to JCDecaux
in 2007 for 10 years. The contract was prolonged for another year and will end by the end
of 2017. After conclusion of the tendering procedure, in April 2017 it was announced that
the service would be operated by the French start-up Smoove, as from 1 January 2018.
JCDecaux received exclusive control over 1,628 city-owned billboards, which were
supposed to produce revenue of EUR 60 million per year (Nadal 2007). The city receives
about half of that advertising space at no charge for public-interest advertising. A further
local subsidy of around EUR 15 million per year has been necessary, mostly to compensate
vandalism and theft.
According to data published by the city government for 2015 (Mairie de Paris, 2016), the
user needs a subscription that can last from one day to one year. The use of a bicycle is
free for the first 30 minutes. After that, it has a fee for any extra 30-minute period (from
EUR 1 to EUR 4). Unlimited rentals can be made during a subscription period.
In 2015, the total number of annual subscriptions was 295,440. 60% of users were male.
57% of the users were between 14 and 35 years old.
In 2015, the total number of trips was 39.39 million (3% of the total number of trips in
all mass-transit modes). During the same period, 1,520 million subway and 434 million
bus trips were taken.
Peak use is between 8am and 10am and between 6pm and 8pm. 30% of trips are made
for commuting. The service is evenly distributed among the days of the week, but
significant variations exist throughout the year (4.3 million trips in June and 2.2 million in
February).
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A third generation of carsharing has emerged around peer-to-peer models. They work as a
roundtrip service, but the vehicle is not owned by the system manager, but rather by a private
individual who is not present in the car while driving around. The system is managed by an
online platform (Martin, Shaheen, 2016). Some European start-ups active in this segment are
Nobobil in Norway, Ridebite in Sweden, SocialCar in Spain or Tamyca in Germany. In December
2016, Daimler & Allianz launched a peer-to-peer system under the name Croove. Car owners
seem reluctant to share their vehicles due to liability issues.27 This is why active participation
of insurance companies is common in these systems.
According to BCG (2016), there are more than 86,000 vehicles under all types of carsharing,
and a total of 5.8 million registered users worldwide. In 2015, carsharing revenue reached EUR
650 million worldwide.28 Based on the number of vehicles in Europe, it can be assumed that
the annual revenue of carsharing in Europe was around EUR 230 million in 2015.
Figure 3: Number of carsharing vehicles and registered users in 2015
Source: BCG (2016)
However, existing carsharing systems tend to be geographically limited to very dense areas in
major metropolitan areas. They are usually limited to cities with a population over 500,000 and
are only operable in city centres.
Market development reports on carsharing systems in Europe focus mostly on EU-15 where
several companies are already quite established in the urban mobility systems. However,
development is picking up speed in central and eastern Europe. In October 2016, Traficar
27 According to a study in San Francisco, half of car owners would not consider sharing their private car due to liability
reasons (Ballús-Armet et al., 2014).
28 In Frost & Sullivan (2011) it was forecasted that in 2020, and only in Europe, the number of vehicles would reach
200,000, the number of registered users would reach 14 million, and the revenue would be of EUR 7 billion.
However, a substantial divergence is identified on the average revenue per vehicle. In BCG (2016), the average
revenue per vehicle is EUR 7,558 per year. In Frost & Sullivan (2011), the average revenue is EUR 35,000, which
seems to be exaggerated.
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started Poland’s first app-based car sharing service in Krakow and received over a thousand
registrations in the first week, according to the provider (Eltis, 2016).
Box 3: Carsharing in Germany
The market for carsharing systems is relatively mature in Germany. Berlin is often referred
to as the “carsharing capital of the world”. There are three carsharing systems in
competition and a large pool of vehicles (2,900 in 2015).
Research conducted for the city of Berlin determined that “at EUR 4.95, the cost of
travelling 7.5 kilometres (the average distance of a carsharing trip) via a carsharing
service is considerably less than the EUR 18.90 cost of a taxi for the same distance, but
more than the EUR 3.45 cost of a private car and the EUR 2.70 fare on public
transportation.” (BCG, 2016).
However, even in Berlin, carsharing meets a very limited fraction of the total mobility
needs, as it only represents 0.1% of all mobility options, compared with 29.5% of the
private vehicle (BCG, 2016).
Figure 4: Concentration of free-floating carsharing* in the city centre of Berlin
Source: Civity (2014)
* Please see section 2.2.2 for definition of the free-floating carsharing
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4.2.3 Ridesharing & ride-splitting
The most powerful transformation forces in the shared mobility environment are currently
ridesharing services. Online platforms like Uber or Lyft facilitate the contracting of transport
services between service providers and users. Technology allows the automatised matching of
providers and users.
Ridesharing can bring massive efficiencies to urban transport. Traditional taxi services faced
serious challenges to match offer and demand. Taxis would drive around the city looking for
passengers while passengers would wait on the street for a taxi to drive near them. Taxi ranks
and radio networks were alternative means for drivers and passengers to meet, but mostly
unsatisfactory. Passengers would have to wait for the service, and drivers spent a very
significant portion of their time driving with no passengers (ECMT, 2007).
Technology does not only allow simplifying communication with a radio network. Apps allow
automatized, fast, reliable and inexpensive communications. Nevertheless, this is only a minor
issue in ridesharing. The main innovation is efficiency in matching offer and demand, drivers
and passengers. Thanks to algorithms that take into consideration variables such as the location
both of drivers and potential passengers (geo-localisation is made possible by smartphones),
transit patterns, previous transactions, etc., the platform automatically matches drivers and
passengers. Waiting times are reduced for passengers, and drivers spend less time in empty-
runs. Therefore, costs are reduced and prices can be lowered for passengers. As prices are
reduced, new demand joins the market, triggering further efficiencies on the matching of
drivers and passengers. This is the power behind ridesharing.
Ridesharing apps had been used by 15% of all US adults by December 2015 (Smith, 2016).
They were more popular among younger individuals: 28% of individuals between 18 and 29
had used them, and only 4% of individuals above 65. They are more popular among college
educated individuals (29%) and high earning individuals (26% among individuals earning more
than USD 75,000) living in urban areas (21%).
The service focuses on the most central, high-density areas. A study by Civity
Management concluded that free-floating carsharing systems are more profitable the
smaller their catchment areas are (Civity, 2014). Therefore, there is a limitation to the
extent to which the service can be grown to reach more citizens. Apart from this economic
aspect, there are also limitations to the extent to which free-floating systems can offer
more efficient transport. In Berlin, a free-floating car is in use 62 minutes per day. That
is significantly better than the 36 minutes an average private car is used each day but not
good enough to be able to offer a solution to spatial problems e.g. lack of parking spaces
in inner cities.
A study by a German carsharing association revealed that the availability of carsharing
systems has an impact on household’s decisions to abandon their cars (BCG, 2016).
Carsharing users in Germany have a higher percentage of public transport subscriptions
and a lower average car ownership as compared to other European countries. The
substitution effect is however not as strong as sometimes claimed by carsharing
associations, especially for the free-floating systems. Here, the substitution effect is only
between 6.5% and 9.2%. There are even cases such as in the city of Munich, where free-
floating carsharing users have a slightly higher average rate of car ownership and higher
average rate of car usage. This might be explained by the high rent of the average user
of these systems, particularly when limited to the central area in a city.
Infrastructure funding challenges in the sharing economy
47
US based Uber is the leading ridesharing platform worldwide, active in more than 500 cities,
with 40 million active users monthly, spending an average of USD 50 per month (Lynley, 2016).
In 2016, Uber had a worldwide revenue of USD 663 million, and the value of the mediated
services was USD 20 billion (up from 10 billion in 2015) (Fortune, 2017). Uber is also the
leading ridesharing platform in Europe. However, ridesharing is less developed in Europe than
in the US, China (where the market leader, Didi Chuxing, is active in 400 Chinese cities) or
India (where Ola is active in more than 100 cities), due mostly to regulatory restrictions and
fragmentation of the market. There are some European competitors to Uber, such as Cabify in
Spain, but they are operating at a much smaller scale.
Ridesharing can support different kinds of services. The most transformative has been the
facilitation of services by non-professional individuals, on a peer-to-peer framework. Uber
championed this model in the US. The introduction of the same service in Europe raised more
opposition and some Member States even banned the provision of the service. European
regulation often excludes the provision of services by individuals without a specific license for
the provision of the service.
Ridesharing can support more traditional services. In Europe, Uber is facilitating transport
services provided by licensed operators with Private Hire Vehicle (PHV) licenses. Mytaxi
facilitates services provided by licensed taxis. Mytaxi, after the merger with Hailo, claims to
have 70 million passengers and 100,000 registered taxis in 50 cities. Mytaxi is controlled by
the German car manufacturer Daimler (Taylor, 2016).
Competition exists among all the services supported by online platforms, but prices are
different. Licensed PHV services can be priced around 20% below regulated taxi services. Peer-
to-peer services have been charged at a price around 35% below regulated taxi tariffs.
A further evolution of ridesharing is ride-splitting. Online platforms can match a driver with
more than one passenger, so they can share the cost of the service. Ride-splitting was an
abandoned practice in most of Europe, as it significantly delayed the duration of trips.
Algorithms, however, allow the best matching of passengers as to avoid excessive waiting times
or detours to accommodate the needs of the different passengers.
There are different forms of ride-splitting. The simplest form is just a fixed itinerary along a
very dense route. The driver meets the passengers at a fixed location and drives them to a
fixed location. Dynamic ride-sharing with passenger pick-ups and drops-off along automatically
designed routes requires a mature software and a very dense volume of drivers and passengers.
Ride-splitting can be provided by non-professional drivers in their private vehicles, but also by
professional drivers with cars or larger vehicles.
Ride-splitting is already a reality. Both Uber and Lyft are providing the service in the US. Uber
claims that more than 100 million uberPOOL services were provided in the first 18 months of
operation, which began in 2014 (Manjo, 2016). Start-ups around Europe are developing new
innovative business models. However, these services face significant regulatory restrictions.
Exclusive rights are often granted to mass-transit operators to provide services along
predefined routes. Some Member States, as Spain, prohibit selling independent seats in taxis
and other transport services.
The combined effect of ride-splitting and self-driving vehicles could have a major impact on
urban transportation in the future. Theoretical exercises suggest that such a combination,
together with a mass-transit system, might remove 90% of cars in a medium-size European
city such as Lisbon (ITF, 2015).
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Box 4: Uber and the application of EU Law
4.3 Substitution of other transport modes
It is interesting to advance what the impact of shared mobility will be in the existing transport
mode split in European cities. Such an evolution will determine the challenges in infrastructure
funding in the next decades.
Today, European cities present quite a heterogeneous mix of transport modes, which is
reflected in Figure 5. In the large cities, as an average, the private car has a share of 42.3% of
trips, mass-transit 30.2% and walking and bicycle 27.5%
There is a pending preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union on the
legal nature of Uber services, raised by Commercial Court no 3 of Barcelona (Case C-
434/15), to be decided before the end of 2017.
Taxi associations claim that Uber provides transport services without a transport license,
and therefore breaches national legislation on transportation and on unfair competition.
They claim that national restrictions on transport do not breach EU law on freedom to
provide services, as Article 58(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) excludes “services in the field of transport” from the application of the general
rules in the TFEU on freedom to provide services. In the same line, Directive 123/2006/EC
(the Service Directive) is not applicable to such services.
Uber claims that it merely provides electronic intermediation services. Such services are
information society services as defined in Directive 2000/31/EC (e-commerce Directive)
and are protected by the freedom to provide services as defined in such Directive.
Furthermore, intermediation services are not services “in the field of transport”, as
Directive 123/2006 explicitly states that intermediation services, i.e. those provided by
travel agencies, are covered by the Directive. Consequently, national restrictions would
have to comply with EU Law on freedom to provide services.
The European Commission made public a Communication on the nature of the service of
collaborative economy platforms (European Commission, 2016c). The Commission tries
to draw the borderline between intermediation and the provision of the underlying service.
According to the Commission “when these three criteria are met, there are strong
indications that the collaborative platform […] is also providing the underlying service”:
(i) The platform sets the price; (ii) The platform sets other contractual terms; (iii) The
platform owns the key assets to provide the underlying service (vehicles, etc.).
National restrictions have been common. Different Courts in the Member States (i.e.
Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Portugal, Romania, Spain) have issued bans against the
provision of the uberPOP service (a peer-to-peer service) based on different grounds
(breach of transport regulation, unfair competition, etc.). Specific legislation has been
adopted in Member States either as an obstacle to the provision of electronic
intermediation services (i.e. France, Hungary) or, on the contrary, to expressly
accommodate them in the local regulatory framework (Estonia). Currently, Uber provides
services in most European Member States, but based on licensed transport services
(mostly PHV licenses).
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Figure 5: Modal split on the home-work route in EU cities of more than 200,000
inhabitants (%)29
Source: Fondazione per lo Sviluppo Sostenibile (2016, p. 134)
29 The average value is calculated out of 69 medium-large European cities. The chart represents the first 24 European
cities. Values refer to the most updated year available (between 2006, less updated, and 2011, most recent).
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As shared mobility matures, some substitution patterns have already been identified. They are
described in Figure 6, with data from the US. There is no parallel study for Europe, but studies
on specific cities and specific transport modes confirm the same trends identified in the US.
Figure 6: Alternative if a transport mode was not available
Source: SUMC (2016, p. 16)
In the US we observe that bikesharing has a limited (if relevant) impact on the use of private
vehicles. Rather, it is substituting walking, the use of the private bicycle and, in particular,
mass-transit services (see Figure 7). This trend is confirmed for cities outside the US
(Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 2010, Murphy, Usher, 2015).
Figure 7: Mode substitution by bikesharing in selected cities
Source: Fishman et al. (2014)
Infrastructure funding challenges in the sharing economy
51
Carsharing and ridesharing have a limited substitution effect on mass-transit. Rather, they
substitute the use and even the ownership of private cars.
Ridesharing might be less expensive than regulated taxi services (so it substitutes taxis30) but
they are still significantly more expensive than mass-transit. As a consequence, little
substitution among the two transport modes has been identified. In more developed markets
in the US, ridesharing usage for commuting is very limited. Only 20% of ridesharing trips is for
commuting. It is more common to use ridesharing for recreation/social purposes (above 55%)
and shopping errands (18%) (SUMC, 2016 p. 11).
As UITP has stated, “on their own these new mobility services do not have the capability or
capacity to meet citizens’ mobility needs or solve traffic congestion. As an example, in San
Francisco, the well-established home market of Uber and Lyft, they represent only 1-2% of all
trips.” (UITP, 2016) Likewise, carsharing in Berlin only represents 0.1% of the trips in the city.
An exception might be ride-splitting services. Ride-splitting services can significantly lower the
cost of the provision of the service, particularly when larger vehicles are used. UberPOOL
services can be even 65% cheaper than the regular Uber service in the US (Uber, 2017a).
Consequently, ride-splitting prices can start to compete with mass-transit services.31
Ridesharing substitutes the use of the private vehicle. Frequent users of ridesharing services in
the US are less prone to drive a car daily or weekly, 63% against 84% of non-users, and less
likely to own a personal car, 64% against 78% (Smith, 2016). A study on Stockholm by
Copenhagen Economics (2015), commissioned by Uber, concluded that the total number of
active cars in the city would be reduced by 18,000 (5% of the total) if peer-to-peer ridesharing
services were launched. A survey among Uber users, funded by Uber, reported that 22% of
them were holding off on purchasing a car thanks to the ridesharing service (Deamicis, 2015).
A number of studies also confirm this trend for carsharing services.32
A wider perspective helps to better evaluate the impact of shared mobility on urban transport.
It is the combined effect of all shared mobility modes, together with mass-transit, that offers a
reliable alternative to the usage and ownership of a private car. As has been repeatedly stated
by UITP: “it is the offer of an integrated combination of sustainable urban mobility services that
most effectively challenges the flexibility and convenience of the private car. A broader mix of
mobility services is the answer to ever more complex and intense mobility needs. […] car-based
services and especially car-sharing are the obvious services that complement public transport
as they offer the benefits linked to car usage without the need to own the car.” (UITP, 2016, p.
2).
Shared mobility complements mass-transit as it helps to overcome the three most relevant
weak points of mass-transit: availability (it is not always available with a station near the origin
and destination of a trip), reliability (it is not always open 24/7) and comfort (luggage, speed,
etc.).
30 The effect of the sharing economy on taxis, even if relevant, is not in the scope of this study.
31 A specific study on uberPOOL concludes that uberPOOL complements mass-transit rather than substituting it
(Schwietermann, Michel, 2016).
32 In Martin, Shaheen (2016), it is stated that active members of the car2go system in five US cities sold a vehicle
they had due to car2go (2% to 5%) or avoided a vehicle purchase (7% to 10%). As a result, car2go members sold
between 1 to 3 vehicles per car2go vehicle (on average), suppressed the need for between 4 to 9 vehicles per
car2go vehicle and overall, when considering both effects together, each car2go vehicle removed between 7 to 11
vehicles from the road of the five cities studied (on average).
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First, shared mobility is used as “first mile/last mile” to complement mass-transit. As mass-
transit can only serve high-density areas, shared mobility solutions allow passengers to move
from their premises to mass-transit stations. Uber has often provided data on how a significant
share of their services initiate or terminate at a subway or train station, both in Europe and in
the US (Smith, A., Salzberg, A., 2016). Uber published evidence on how the launching of night
tube services in London modified the service and reinforced service from and to the operating
tube station (Rao, 2016). The same effect has been identified for bikesharing (Jäppinen, S.,
Toivonen, T., Salonen, M., 2013).
Second, shared mobility complements mass-transit when it is not active, particularly at night
time. Ridesharing is particularly used 8pm-4am, when mass-transit systems reduce operations
or even suspend them. On the contrary, ridesharing usage is at its lowest point between 5am-
10am, in the morning rush hours (SUMC, 2016 p. 12). It has also been identified that
bikesharing systems usually have a strong use at night (Shaheen, Martin, 2015).
Third, shared mobility, in particular car-based modes, provides the necessary flexibility to make
specific trips for which mass-transit might not be suitable (trips with heavy luggage, trips when
handicapped, trips that might require more speed, etc.).
The most relevant study on the subject so far, undertaken for the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) by the Shared-Use Mobility Center (SUMC) confirms this.
The main conclusion of the study was that “people who take greater advantage of shared modes
report lower household vehicle ownership and decreased spending on transportation” (SUMC,
2016, p. 7). In parallel, “the more people use shared modes, the more likely they are to use
public transit” (SUMC, 2016, p. 3).
The key point is not the substitution of specific trips in private vehicles. Each mode, either
shared mobility or mass-transit, might be in the position to substitute specific private car trips.
However, no mode is a perfect substitute for car ownership. It is a usual trend that once an
individual takes on the fixed cost of acquiring a private vehicle, they spontaneously tend to use
the vehicle for every trip. Therefore it is important to provide a viable alternative to private
vehicle ownership. Mass-transit has traditionally failed (with the exception of very dense areas
in very large congested cities) in this regard. Mass-transit combined with shared transport
provides a viable alternative to private car ownership.
Shared mobility, in its different modes, complementing mass-transit, creates a combined offer
that is in the position to compete with the private car and substitute private car usage and
ownership.
4.4 Mobility as a Service
The combined provision of mass-transit and shared mobility services has been identified as the
next challenge in urban transportation. Mobility as a Service is emerging as the model for such
a combined offer. Mobility as a Service is described as “a system, in which a comprehensive
range of mobility services are provided to customers by a company which buys mobility services
from service producers, combines them as a service supply and provides the services to
consumers” (Heikkilä, 2014).
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Pilot programs on Mobility as a Service have been undertaken in some northern European cities:
Helsinki (Finland), Hannover (Germany) and Gothenburg (Sweden) (Kamargianni et al., 2016)
and the West Midlands (UK).33 A company acquires transport services from the operators of the
transport services and then bundles them under a single brand, a single pricing scheme (either
a flat rate or a “pay as you go” rate) and a single payment system. In this way, private car
ownership can be substituted by the acquisition of Mobility as a Service.
Mobility as a Service would be the final stage of an already existing trend to combine various
transport services into a single ticket or payment system. Mass-transit authorities have been
coordinating different services (subway, tram, buses, etc.) under a single ticketing or payment
system for decades. The next step is to include also transport services provided by private
operators (shared mobility services, taxi, etc.), particularly to overcome the “first/last mile”
challenge.
There is a high number of pilot programs to offer combined solutions with mass-transit and
shared mobility services. Just to name a few: Uber is working with local transit systems in
Atlanta (MARTA), Dallas (DART) and Portland (Uber, 2017b), among others, to combine
services. Car2go has reached an agreement with the high-speed railway operator Italo, to sell
combined tickets (Ferpress, 2014).
Mobility as a Service programs include traditional mass-transit services, plus private services
such as taxi and shared mobility services, to meet fully the mobility needs of different passenger
profiles. Different flat rates meet different needs of different profiles.
The key question is who will act as the leader of this model (Holmberg et al., 2016). Leadership
could be taken by public authorities, as they are already managing mass-transit, which is
perceived as the backbone of the system. Private online platforms might take the lead,
integrating all different transport modes, and in particular mass-transit services, as they have
proven the ability to manage multisided markets and create the necessary indirect network
externalities. “Transport operators will benefit by creating a larger market via the integrated
platform” (Kamargianni et al., 2015).
Differing political traditions are relevant to determine the leadership in the development of
Mobility as a Service. In Europe, there is often a notion that it is the local public authorities’
responsibility to ensure the availability of public transport to all citizens. In the US, mass-transit
transport is more the pragmatic consequence of congestion in denser cities, and not so much
a shared political goal in itself.
In any case, the financial implications of this model for the funding of transport infrastructure
are of the utmost relevance. The debate will focus on the pricing conditions under which mass-
transit services are provided through online platforms. Such pricing might determine the
sustainability of urban transport infrastructure.
The inclusion of mass-transit services as underlying services mediated by an online platform
together with other services raises questions about the definition of the prices of the mass-
transit services, the commissions to be charged by online platforms and overall, whether in this
new ecosystem, transport infrastructure funding will be ensured.
33 Helsinki-based MaaS Global offers their Service in Helsinki, Finland (Whimapp, 2017a) and the West Midlands, UK
(Whimapp, 2017b).
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5. CHALLENGES FOR CURRENT MECHANISMS OF
INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING
KEY FINDINGS
 Carpooling services are replacing long distance mass-transit services, thereby
reducing revenue from passenger fares.
 A reduction in mass-transit passengers might trigger a vicious cycle of reduction in
frequencies and further reductions in passengers of railway and coach services. Such a
development would challenge the existing PSOs for land transport connections. As
revenue from passengers is reduced, more public funding is necessary to sustain the
same level of quality. This also threatens the current financial equilibrium of internal
cross subsidies in an undertaking with exclusive rights for the provision of packages of
both profitable and non-profitable services. Finally, the revenue of railway
infrastructure managers is also reduced.
 In the long term, the situation could reverse. As private vehicle ownership
diminishes due to growing alternatives at an urban level, travellers will
increasingly rely on alternatives for long distance trips. If only 10% of travellers making
use of cars migrate to mass-transit services, the number of passengers of publicly
available transport services would double: All alternatives would benefit, i.e.
carpooling, car-rental and mass-transit services.
 Online platforms pose further threats to transport infrastructure funding, as they can
reduce the funding available for infrastructure either by capturing a growing share
of the value created by the whole ecosystem (through commissions) or by
eroding it. Value appropriation does not seem to be an issue at the moment, but the
risk exists as platforms might take a leading role in integrated mobility solutions
including mass-transit services. In this scenario, value erosion is also possible if pricing
of access to mass-transit services for platforms is not properly defined.
 As public subsidies are a major source for infrastructure funding, it is important to
ensure that new players, such as platforms and peer-to-peer providers, contribute
to the funding of the underlying infrastructures. This can be through taxation or
other forms of financial contribution to infrastructures.
5.1 Introduction
Over time, an unstable equilibrium has been reached in the different transport modes as to
how to fund transport infrastructure. Transport infrastructure, including both physical
infrastructure (roads and tracks) and assets for the provision of transport services (vehicles,
rolling stock, etc.), requires massive investment to be built, maintained and operated. The
delicate balance of public finance and payments by users of transport services, the two main
sources of funding, is constantly under discussion.
The sharing economy, and in general digitalisation, poses a new challenge to the already
complex funding of transport infrastructure. As the ICTs empower new interactions among the
different players in the transport ecosystem, the existing equilibria are challenged.
The effect of digitalisation, platforms and peer-to-peer services on other industries, including
other network industries, can provide valuable insights on the impact of the sharing economy
on transport infrastructure funding.
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The following challenges can be identified: (i) Challenges created by the substitution effect; (ii)
Value appropriation by online platforms; (iii) Value erosion by new services; (iv) Data
management.
5.2 Challenges created by the substitution effect
The sharing economy is creating new services that substitute traditional transport services. As
users migrate to the new services, traditional providers experience a reduction in the revenue
they receive as a payment for the provision of their services.
The leading example of the substitution effect from a non-transport sector is the postal industry.
A new digital service such as electronic mail has substituted a significant portion of the services
traditionally provided by postal operators. The subsequent reduction of revenue is forcing postal
operators to adapt their infrastructure to the lower volumes of transported items and/or explore
new services to diversify their revenue sources.
As discussed in chapter 3 of this study, shared mobility solutions are substituting long distance
mass-transit services (both railways and coaches). In an urban context, such substitution is
not taking place at a relevant scale. On the contrary, shared mobility at the urban level is
reinforcing mass-transit systems as the use and ownership of the private vehicle is reduced.
The situation might change overtime.
5.2.1 Revenue reduction for long distance mass-transit land services
It has been identified (see section 3.3) that long distance carpooling is detracting a substantial
number of passengers from long distance passenger mass-transit land services (railways and
coaches). As a direct consequence, the reduction in the number of passenger-km caused a
reduction of revenue derived from passenger fares. This is already happening at a substantial
scale in countries where carpooling is more mature, such as France and Spain. It can be
expected in other European countries as well.
Revenue reduction, as a proportion, is more severe than passenger reduction. Several reasons
explain this effect:
First, mass-transit services being substituted are those services provided in peak hours at full
rate, while substitution is smaller at off-peak periods, often charged at a discount to attract
travellers. There are several reasons justifying this substitution:
 Carpooling services are more frequent in peak times, particularly Friday and Sunday
afternoon (GART/UTP, 2014, p. 110). In off-peak periods, matching drivers and
passengers is more difficult (CGDD, 2016, p. 6), as offer is scarcer and does not always
meet demand, particularly on routes with low and medium density. On the contrary,
mass-transit services are ensured throughout the day, also in off-peak hours, often
through legal or contractual obligations;
 Travellers are price-sensitive and they tend to switch to carpooling when the price of
the railway service is more expensive. For example, this is the case during peak hours,
when full price for railway tickets is charged and few discounts are available.
Second, carpooling is having a more substantial effect on high-price services, which previously
had no direct substitute. This is the case of high-speed railway services in France.
Third, the revenue of mass-transit operators is further reduced as operators lower their prices
to meet the new competition from carpooling. Therefore, the financial impact of substitution is
larger than the percentage of passengers lost to carpooling. With the French example, as it has
been estimated that passenger-km have been reduced in 6% in 2015.
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Such revenue reduction will put more pressure on the already stressed finances of mass-transit
operators and the growing funding gap expected for the future (Booz&co, 2012). Fares paid by
passengers are, of course, one of the main sources of revenue for mass-transit operators. For
instance, railways in the European Union are funded according to the following percentages:
40% passenger fares, 20% freight fares, 30% public subsidies and 10% other sources (figures
correspond to 2012, Steer Davies Gleave 2016, p. 17). Long distance services receive
significantly less public subsidies than suburban railway services.
Revenue reduction will affect investment in long distance mass-transit systems. Investment in
new rolling stock and coaches might be deferred. Frequencies might have to be reduced. A
deterioration of the service can be expected.
5.2.2 Vicious cycle
Reduction in frequencies is a major issue. Continuity of service is one of the fundamental traits
of public passenger transport. It is even included in the definition of public passenger transport
in Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007: “passenger transport services of general economic interest
provided to the public on a non-discriminatory and continuous basis” (Art. 2(a)).
As revenue from passenger fares is reduced, mass-transit operators will face pressure to reduce
costs. Cost reduction can derive from the reduction in the number of services, reducing
frequencies in specific routes.
However, the reduction of frequencies triggers a vicious cycle in the mass-transit systems. As
the frequency of service is reduced and waiting times get longer, mass-transit is not able to
meet the needs of passengers and therefore triggers a further reduction of passengers and
revenue, further reductions in frequencies, etc. This effect, known as the “Mohring effect”, as
in Mohring (1972), has been frequently identified (for instance in Bar-Yosef et al., 2013).
Carpooling could trigger such a vicious cycle in long distance mass transit services, particularly
on non-dense routes.
5.2.3 Sustainability of PSO
The substitution effect identified in long distance land transport is a challenge to the provision
of services under PSO. PSO is defined in Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 as “a requirement
defined or determined by a competent authority in order to ensure public passenger transport
services in the general interest that an operator, if it were considering its own commercial
interests, would not assume or would not assume to the same extent or under the same
conditions without reward” (art. 2(e)).
Two models of public schemes to compensate mass-transit operators for the provision of PSO
can be identified.
First, public subsidies can be granted for the provision of transportation services, particularly
for low-density routes, usually connecting rural areas. Such subsidies can be granted both to
railway and coach services. As a reference, the total amount of subsidies granted for the
compensation of railways PSOs in the European Union in 2015 amounted to EUR 20 billion
(Commission 2016a, p. 78).
Carpooling initially concentrated on high-density routes, but as the network effects get
stronger, carpooling can be expected to expand to other routes. In France, routes connecting
large cities (particularly Paris) with rural areas are already popular (ADEME/6T, 2015, p. 61).
The next step is expansion to routes in between rural areas. As revenue from passenger fares
is expected to diminish, an increase in public subsidies to maintain the same level of service
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(particularly frequencies) will be necessary. If such funds are not available, the quality of mass-
transit services will have to diminish.
Second, compensation from public authorities may be seen in the form of granting exclusive
rights to provide services on a profitable route, in such a way that profits for the provision of
the service cross-subsidise other non-profitable services imposed on the service provider. This
model is used both in railways (for instance in the United Kingdom) and in coaches (for instance
in Spain). Such a model relies on the existence of a monopoly in the profitable service, and
weak competition from other transport modes, as otherwise it would not be possible to extract
the necessary rent from the profitable services to cross-subsidise the other services.
Carpooling is introducing new competition in the long distance market. It is a threat to this
model of PSO funding. High prices due to artificial margins in the profitable services are possible
if there is no good substitute for the monopolized service. However, if there is a good substitute,
extraordinary high prices are a powerful incentive to migrate to the alternative transport mode
(“cream-skimming”). It has already been shown that carpooling is a good substitute for railways
and coaches. As monopolists loose revenue in the profitable services, they will face financial
constraints to cover the cost of the non-profitable services. If there is no objective limitation to
the competitiveness of carpooling, like road congestion, this model of public intervention
becomes unviable.
For all these reasons, carpooling poses a fundamental challenge to the funding of long distance
passenger transport under PSO.
5.2.4 Impact on physical infrastructure funding
Substitution of long distance mass-transit services by carpooling also has an impact on physical
infrastructure funding. It is necessary to differentiate among transport modes and national
situations.
Railway infrastructure relies heavily on public funds in the form of subsidies to the railway
infrastructure manager, but a significant share of infrastructure costs are covered with the
access charges paid by railway undertakings for the use of the infrastructure. As railway
undertakings lose passengers and revenue, a reduction in access charges paid by railway
undertakings to infrastructure managers can also be expected.
The percentage of the total costs borne by railway undertakings is very different in the Member
States. For instance, in 2012, it was 59% in France and 46% in Germany, but only 7% in
Sweden, as shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Percentage of access charges from the total revenue of railway
Infrastructure Managers’ (IMs) in 2012
Source: elaboration of Finger, Putallaz, Van De Velde (2015, p. 24)
The structure of railways access charges is different in each Member State, but the principle in
Article 31(3) of Directive 2012/34/EU is that “charges […] shall be set at the cost that is directly
incurred as a result of operating the train service.” It is common to pay a fee for each vehicle-
km making use of the infrastructure, and even to take into consideration the number of
passengers.
Consequently, the higher the reliance on access charges for the funding of the infrastructure
manager (against reliance on public subsidies), the higher the impact of carpooling on the
funding of railway infrastructure. As in certain Member States (i.e. France, Belgium and
Germany) railway infrastructure is funded in a significant percentage through access charges,
reduction in the number of passengers will cause a parallel reduction in funding for the railway
infrastructure.
Road infrastructure relies more heavily on public funds than railway infrastructure. Only a minor
percentage of costs are covered by users in the form of tolls, which are usually limited to high-
capacity roads, and are not introduced in all Member States. As demonstrated in Figure 9, in
line with the Directive 1999/62/EC, Member States have adopted various approaches in
applying tolls on their road networks, ranging from the introduction of a country-wide toll (as
in the case of Portugal) to a zero-charges scheme as in the case of 12 Member States, including
Germany.
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Figure 9: Road infrastructure charges for light private vehicles34 in the EU
Source: elaboration of European Commission (2015c)
Furthermore, migration from coaches to private vehicles should not have a major impact on
the revenue of those road infrastructures funded through tolls. When roads are funded with
public funds, it is neutral whether there is a lower number of coaches and a higher number of
cars. When there are tolls, private vehicles already fund the infrastructure with tolls. In this
scenario, it would be simple to adapt toll-pricing structures to the new profile of vehicles making
use of the road (less coaches, more private vehicles). Even more, as in some Member States
such as Germany, coaches are exempt from paying tolls, so migration from coaches to private
cars would increase revenue to fund roads in the form of tolls.
As a consequence, and contrary to the situation in railways, the reduction in the number of
coach passengers should not have a substantial impact on the funding of roads.
34 The light private vehicles category comprises passenger cars, motorcycles and other motor vehicles with total
permissible mass of no more than 3.5 tonnes predominantly used for private purposes.
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The divergent approaches to infrastructure charging in road and rail create the wrong
incentives: rail access charges disincentivise the use of railways against road transport when
no tolls are in place. This effect is reinforced by carpooling, as it benefits the regulatory
competitive advantage of not having to contribute directly to the funding of the infrastructure
it uses. The higher the toll, the smaller the price advantage of carpooling against railways. The
same goes for coach services where coaches do not have to pay for highways at all (Germany).
Finally, uncertainty on future volumes of passengers will have an impact on investment. It is
more challenging to decide on investment when it is more difficult to forecast the evolution of
the number of passengers. This is particularly relevant, as investment in transport physical
infrastructure requires decades to be recovered.
As a conclusion, substitution of long distance mass-transit services by carpooling has an impact
on the funding of mass-transit services, PSO and transport infrastructure (particularly railway
infrastructure).
5.2.5 Long term evolution
The scenario might substantially change in the long term. If changes at the urban level reduce
the rate of car-ownership, this will have a major impact on long distance transportation.
Travellers without a private vehicle will make more intense use both of mass-transit and shared
mobility solutions when traveling long distance.
Private vehicle is the preferred transportation mode for long distance trips all around Europe,
with a very high market share (see Figure 10 for details).
Figure 10: Passenger land transport modal split (EU average in % of passenger-km)
Source: European Commission (2016a, p. 19)
If only a fraction of car users switches to public transportation, the overall number of public
transportation travellers will increase substantially. Based on the 2014 data shown in Figure
10, if only 10% of travellers making use of cars migrated to mass-transit services, the number
of mass-transit passengers would double.
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If the decline of private vehicle ownership at the urban level evolves fast enough, it could
counterbalance the impact of the sharing economy on the funding of long distance traveling.
However, at the moment there is no evidence that such counterbalance is taking place.
Carpooling for long distance travel is growing at a faster pace than the substitution of the
private vehicle at an urban level. Regulatory obstacles to the development of shared mobility
at a local level might be one explanation. In any case, it can be expected that such a structural
transformation in urban transportation (reducing car ownership) will take place at a slower pace
than the more punctual migration of travellers in long distance transportation from mass-transit
to shared mobility.
In the long term and in the most optimistic scenarios, shared mobility might pose a new
challenge to mass-transit. If private car ownership diminishes substantially, a very large surge
in demand for long distance mass-transit might take place. The existing infrastructure would
not be able to cope with such an increase in demand, and massive investment might be required
to completely redefine long distance transportation.
5.3 Value appropriation by online platforms
Online platforms are the managers of the data layer. Platforms such as BlaBlaCar, Uber and
others are providing intermediation services that allow transport service providers to interact
with passengers for a more efficient provision of the underlying transport service.
Intermediation services are provided for remuneration. The remuneration takes the form of a
commission, a percentage of the value of the intermediated transport service. Such a
commission can be charged to the transport service provider (Uber), the passenger (BlaBlaCar)
or even to both parties.
Platforms might provide the intermediation service without remuneration as a market entry
strategy, in order to trigger the participation in the platform both of transport service providers
and of passengers. This was the case, for instance, for BlaBlaCar.
As the platform attracts a significant number of users, indirect network effects grow and the
benefits derived from such an externality can be distributed among all the parties. The platform
itself can absorb a significant portion of the benefits in the form of commissions on the price of
the underlying service.
Commissions can reach a significant portion of the price of the underlying transport service.
Uber usually charges a 20% or 25% commission to drivers, but it has tested even a 30%
commission in the mature markets of San Francisco and San Diego in the US (Macmillan, 2015).
BlaBlaCar charges passengers a variable commission, smaller as the price of the trip increases,
with an average of around 20% of the price of the service in the more mature markets.
Commissions by transport platforms in Europe have been estimated to be EUR 1.6 billion out
of the total transaction value of EUR 5.1 billion in 2015. For 2025, it has been estimated that
commissions will reach EUR 33 billion (PwC, 2016).
Platforms such as BlaBlaCar and Uber have created new services at very attractive prices by
efficiently coordinating extremely fragmented service providers, including non-professional
providers. Commissions do not seem to threaten the attractiveness of their services and,
despite some complaints, both platforms continue to grow.
Successful platforms enjoy strong positions once they reach the necessary critical mass
(Bundeskartellamt, 2016). However, the very same nature of this industrial organisation model
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poses a limit to potential abuses by platforms. If commissions pose too much of a burden on
any of the sides active in the platform, they would leave the platform, reducing the benefits
created by the indirect network effect and diminishing the value of the platform for all its
participants and for the platform manager itself. Platforms are only successful if the right
equilibrium is maintained for all participating entities. This effect has been graphically coined
as “the second invisible hand” (Koopman et al., 2015), building on the invisible hand metaphor
by Adam Smith.
Nevertheless, platforms might grow as to include traditional transport service providers. There
is a trend to integrate a growing number of transport services under one platform enabling
door-to-door solutions. A platform might integrate a ridesharing service from home to the train
station, a high-speed railway service to another city, and a subway ride to the final destination
of the trip. Mobility as a Service can be included in this trend.
Value appropriation by platforms might become a more relevant issue should aggregation
platforms include traditional transport service providers, in particular mass-transit services. The
finances of mass-transit service providers are already under stress. Intermediaries will interfere
the yield-management systems of mass-transit operators, that is, variable pricing strategies
based on the understanding, anticipating and influencing of consumer behaviour in order to
maximise revenue. Mass-transit operators already perceive this evolution as a threat: “The
challenge is that something from the outside world will act faster than us, and become the
leader of the urban mobility market. This threat is very real” (Caroline Cerfontaine, UITP
Combined Mobility Expert, in UITP, 2014).
If mass-transit service providers are included in aggregation platforms, the definition of prices
for the underlying transport service and the commissions to be charged by the platform will
become a central debate in the industry. This is already the case in telecommunications and
the “net neutrality” debate (Leal, 2014).35
As a conclusion, one of the challenges for infrastructure funding is the appropriation of value
by online platforms. This risk is smaller when platforms intermediate in new peer-to-peer
services. The risk might become more relevant as online platforms might intermediate in the
provision of traditional transport services, as traditional transport service providers are already
under financial stress.
5.4 Value erosion by new services
Digitalisation, and in particular online platforms, has eroded value in many industries, providing
services at no cost for the user or for a very low price, forcing traditional players to reinvent
themselves or even to disappear. It is important to understand these processes in order to
analyse if they could affect the transportation industry.
5.4.1 Advertising as an alternative source to fund services provided at no cost
for the user
Advertising has become the source of funding for services previously funded by the price
charged to the user of the service. Online platforms allow advertisers to interact in new forms
with audiences, in such a way that the free provision of a service becomes a mere attraction
so advertisers can display their content.
This was the case of the services provided by mapping and navigation companies, as their
services started to be provided at no cost for the user by platforms such as Google, as a way
35 The “net neutrality” debate refers to the need to regulate the conditions of the access to internet service, so no
discrimination is introduced by infrastructure managers based on the kind of use of the service, or the type of
content to be accessed, or the provider of the content service.
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to attract an audience for the advertisers. User funding of the service was substituted by
advertiser funding. Online platforms made this new model possible by structuring a new
multisided market connecting advertisers and users through mapping and navigation services
that platforms provide themselves.
Transportation offers interesting possibilities for the display of advertising. Mass-transit
operators are already exploiting the possibility to display advertisements in their physical
infrastructure, their vehicles, and their webs.
Advertising has an important role in the exploitation of bikesharing systems. As already
described (section 4.2.1), such systems are often exploited by advertising companies such as
JCDecaux in exchange for the right to exploit billboards in the city.
In any case, there are limited chances of this kind of substitution taking place in transportation.
The existing players have already exploited many opportunities for the display of advertising.
Furthermore, the potential revenue that advertising could generate does not seem to be enough
to cover the high cost of transport infrastructure. Finally, this model would require the provision
of the transportation service, and it is not viable to fully substitute existing transportation
providers, as platforms have not shown the intention to build their own alternative services, as
they did with mapping and navigation services.
5.4.2 Freeriding
Value can be eroded as new technologies allow traditional services to be provided at no cost
for the user or at a very low price, as a provider can free ride on the investments previously
made by other players.
The clearest example of freeriding is the illegal provision of audio-visual content. Content
providers could hardly face the unfair competition of illegal copies of copyrighted audio-visual
content, often through peer-to-peer exchange of such content.
Freeriding can also take place with infrastructures without infringing any law thanks to
technology. Telecommunications offer very good examples. Platforms such as WhatsApp or
Skype, so-called over-the-top (OTT) providers, make the exchange of written messages or even
voice conversations without charging for the provision of such services possible. As a result,
the revenue of traditional telecommunication operators for the provision of SMS and telephony
services has been significantly eroded.
OTTs can provide their services for free as they are making use of the existing
telecommunications infrastructure, installed and funded by the traditional operators, without
paying for it. This is not illegal. OTTs just exploited a new loophole in the telecommunications
ecosystem. Vertically integrated operators installed and ran the telecommunications
infrastructure, funding it through charges to final users for each specific use of the
infrastructure: each SMS, each minute of telephone call, etc. As internet access services were
launched, users paid a flat fee that allowed them to convey any content through the
infrastructure, including written messages and voice communications. Platforms such as
WhatsApp and Skype just made it possible for users to make use of the internet access service
to get messaging and voice services without having to pay the traditional telecommunications
operator a specific fee.
Traditional telecommunications operators had to modify the way they finance their
infrastructure, by relying more on flat rates for the connection to the network and less on
charges for specific services, which can now be easily bypassed. This exemplifies the need for
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a long-lasting model to finance infrastructures due to the new sharing economy empowered by
platforms.
Freeriding is an important challenge in transportation. There are massive public investments in
transportation infrastructure, both physical infrastructure and transport services. Carpooling is
a good example of freeriding, even if a voluntary one. Vehicle owners are ready to provide
transportation services at a price that does not cover the full cost of the service. Drivers charge
a price to cover the main variable costs (gasoline and tolls), but not the fixed costs of the
acquisition of the vehicle, insurance, repairs, etc. This is a voluntary decision, and it is a rational
one, as drivers would mostly be making the trip anyway, so they save part of the cost of the
trip.
Freeriding can be extended to other segments of the transport ecosystem as the data layer
increases its relevance and aggregation platforms intermediate mass-transit services. If access
conditions to mass-transit services, in particular pricing, are not properly defined, it can create
freeriding situations in the future.
As a conclusion, it is important to ensure that as shared mobility evolves and gets more
complex, all players in the ecosystem contribute to the funding of the infrastructure and no
freeriding exists. The examples of media, telecommunications and electricity show that
freeriding can reduce the available financing for infrastructure. While the same effect has not
been identified at a significant rate for transportation, it might happen in the future as
transportation evolves to Mobility as a Service.
5.4.3 Taxes
Traditional players contribute to the system though the payment of taxes. Domestic transport
services are subject to the Value Added Tax (VAT), even if mass-transit is often subject to a
reduced rate. Corporations active in the transport industry pay corporate tax. Transport service
providers and infrastructure managers pay social contributions for their employees. Just as a
reference, there are more than 900,000 workers directly employed by rail operators and
infrastructure managers in the EU (European Commission, 2016a, p. 11), and more than
500,000 workers directly employed by long distance coach operators (Steer Davies Gleave,
2016, p. 31).
Shared mobility presents some specificity in the payment of taxes and social contributions. On
the one hand, transport service providers do not always pay taxes, particularly in peer-to-peer
transactions. Non-professional providers often do not charge VAT with their fees, they do not
pay corporate taxes nor personal income taxes, and they assume no social contribution. As
these services are substituting transport services provided by traditional operators, a relevant
decrease in taxes and social contributions from the traditional operators will take place, and
such public revenue will not be compensated by new revenue from new transport service
providers. Failure to pay taxes reduces finance available for transport infrastructure and, at the
same time, reinforces the competitiveness of shared mobility against traditional transport.
Online platforms do pay taxes as a regular corporation. However, taxes are not always paid in
the Member State where the underlying transport service is provided. Platforms often are
established in one Member State from where they provide their information society services to
the rest of the European Union. For instance, BlaBlaCar is established in France and Uber is
established in the Netherlands. Taxes on the value appropriated by the online platforms are not
always reinvested in the Member State where the transport service is provided.
As a conclusion, taxes are relevant in order to fund transport infrastructure as well as in order
to have a competitive level playing field.
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5.5 Data management
As stated above, in the sharing economy, a data layer is being created on top of the
infrastructure layer (which includes the transport services). This data layer consists of the
numerous data regarding what is going on in the infrastructure layer, such as passenger
movements, their consumptions, their physical localisations and many other things. Data are
indeed being collected from various sources, but often these data are not directly paid for.
There is the situation where individuals and sometimes also public authorities give away their
data for “free”, often in exchange for various services (such as social media platforms or
inscriptions to a car sharing community), at least in the case of individuals. This is much less
the case of private companies, which much better appreciate the value of the data and ask for
a remuneration for the data they so provide. This raises two questions, a purely financial and
a regulatory one.
Financially, there is the question of the price of the data. If data is seen as a pure commodity,
then this is simply a commercial transaction in which the price of the data is defined by the
transaction. There may be some regulatory action involved in the case of market power and
abuse of dominant position (Autorité De La Concurrence et al., 2016). For example, when an
actor needs data from a dominant actor in order to do business, but is prevented from doing
so because the dominant actor abuses its market power. Very concretely, with regards to public
transport, there is the question of the value of the data that the public transport operator (for
example a railway undertaking) provides to private operators (for example mobility services
providers). As these data have been generated by systems funded, at least in part, by taxpayers
and are now put to profit by private operators, it is fair that the public transport operator
receives some money for its valuable data.
If, instead, data are considered an infrastructure, the question of regulating the data layer
emerges. For example, if it is politically decided that the different transport operators – public
and private – make some of their data available on an open platform, then the question arises
as to the price of such data. Such a price would in any case have to be set by a regulator.
In section 2.4 of this study, we stated that the new data infrastructure is probably not so much
the data itself, but rather the algorithms, which are capable of making sense and use of the
data, generally for commercial purposes. However, these algorithms are the result of
investment into software development and as such are proprietary. Yet, some of them have
public economy implications, especially if not shared. This is the case for energy consumption
or mobility behaviour. Yet, the way energy consumption or mobility behaviour will be
represented, will very much depend upon the underlying algorithms that link the various data
to each other. In this case, it is rather the algorithms that would have to be regulated, so that
the respective way of linking the data together is of public rather than of purely private or
commercial value.
In this line, some platforms have started to share data with local authorities. In January 2017,
Uber announced the decision to share statistical data with local transport authorities and
researchers in all cities where it has a significant presence (Uber, 2017c).
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS
KEY FINDINGS
 More statistical information, particularly in the EU-standardized format, on
shared mobility is necessary. It is recommended to follow best national practices to
produce a good set of data from surveys, web-crawling and traditional statistics at EU
level.
 New shared mobility services should be integrated into the existing regulation.
This way, legal certainty will increase and coherent regulatory policies across all
transport modes, both traditional and new, will be possible. Most of the competences on
transport regulation are national but the EU has competences to ensure the free
provision of information society services.
 It is recommended to promote shared mobility as a substitute for the use and
ownership of the private vehicle. Specific measures are proposed: (i) Promote each
single shared mobility service, in particular ensuring legal certainty; (ii) Promote the
complementarity of shared mobility to mass-transit services (first mile/last mile, etc.);
(iii) Promote Mobility as a Service as the instrument to combine mass-transit and shared
mobility services as a valid alternative to the private vehicle. Transport infrastructure
will benefit from the increase of passengers and revenue in mass-transit systems.
 In limited cases, it has been identified that shared mobility might compete with mass-
transit services. A level playing field is necessary. It is recommended to eliminate
potential regulatory advantages that favour shared mobility over mass-transit
services, such as undue exemptions from charges for the use of the infrastructure,
taxes, social contributions, or PSO financing, particularly when such advantages go
against the commonly agreed policy objectives to reduce congestion, environmental
damage and accidents.
 Shared mobility should be taken into consideration for the redefinition of some public
service policies. Competition from shared mobility is threatening cross-subsidies in
mass-transit franchises of profitable services and non-profitable services. This is often
the case when minimum frequencies are imposed and peak services finance off-peak
services. At the same time, shared mobility provides new possibilities for a more
efficient provision of public service.
 As a new data layer emerges over the traditional physical infrastructure layer and
transport service layer, it is recommended to closely follow the evolution of platforms
active in the transport industry in order to identify arrangements that challenge the
financing of infrastructure at an early stage. Challenges to financing can derive
from value appropriation by platforms in the form of commissions. They can also derive
from the freeriding of existing infrastructure, as has been identified in
telecommunications and energy. It is important to identify and radically exclude
potential free riders from benefiting from weaknesses of traditional business models or
regulatory loopholes.
 Online platforms are centralising a large amount of data on mobility. It is recommended
to ensure that online platforms share big data on itineraries, frequency, duration
and other travel parameters. Online platforms are in a good position to share data
with public authorities for the management of taxes and other legal obligations.
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6.1 Improvement of information
Transportation is a heavily regulated industry and information is necessary to regulate the
industry. Public authorities have information about the activity of traditional operators. Many
players are publicly owned (road and rail infrastructure mangers, railway undertakings, public
local transportation managers) and therefore public authorities have direct access to the
information. Other players are under concession rights or licenses, and therefore under the
obligation to provide information to public authorities (bus, coach and rail service providers).
Good statistics have been developed to track the activity of traditional private players,
particularly in road transportation.
Shared mobility is a new challenge. Public authorities have a very limited visibility about the
activities of online platforms and the underlying transport services. There is little information
on the number of users of the platforms, the number of rides that are contracted, pricing of the
service, number of passenger-km, etc. There is little information on the usage patterns and the
impact of shared mobility on other transport modes.
Eurostat has started to produce statistics about the sharing economy and the use of
collaborative platforms (European Commission, 2016d). However, they are still at a very early
stage.
There are interesting experiences at the national level. The most complete analysis has been
made by the French public authorities on long distance carpooling. It includes customer
surveys, web crawling exercises and projections (see Box 1). There are other national good
practices, such as the Italian National Observatory on Sharing Mobility, and its National Report
on Sharing Mobility (Fondazione per lo sviluppo sostenibile, 2016).
It is recommended to expand interesting national experiences to the EU level. Surveys, web
crawling and traditional statistics can provide the necessary information to improve the
regulation of the industry.
6.2 Integration of shared mobility in the regulatory ecosystem as
new transport modes
It is recommended to integrate shared mobility solutions in the existing regulatory framework
in order to provide legal certainty to all the parties and to adapt the existing regulatory
framework to the new opportunities and the new challenges.
First, it is recommended to provide a regulatory classification for online platforms active in the
transport industry. In the US, the legal category of “Transport Network Companies” (TCM) is
being introduced in a growing number of jurisdictions (for instance California, Illinois,
Massachusetts and many others). It recognises that the services provided by online platforms
are different from the services provided by taxis. TCMs do not own vehicles. They do not provide
transport services in their own name to final users. They intermediate between service
providers and passengers. This is an exercise that could be undertaken at the EU level, mostly
if such service is to be considered an information society service under the definition in Directive
2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce).36
Second, it is recommended to provide a regulatory classification to the different underlying
transport services. Different services can be identified: bikesharing, carsharing, carpooling, etc.
36 The Court of Justice of the European Union has to decide on the nature of Uber as an information society service in
a pending preliminary ruling submitted by the Juzgado de lo Mercantil nº 3 in Barcelona (See Box 4).
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Regulation of transport services is the competence of Member States, and often of local
authorities. In any case, it is important to make sure that these national regulations respect
the freedom of establishment as defined in the TFEU. ”Article 49 TFEU precludes restrictions on
the freedom of establishment. That provision prohibits any national measure, which is liable to
hinder or render less attractive the exercise by European Union nationals of the freedom of
establishment guaranteed by the Treaty. The concept of restriction covers measures taken by
a Member State which, although applicable without distinction, affect access to the market for
undertakings from other Member States and thereby hinder intra-Community trade“. 37 These
regulations aim to provide legal certainty to service providers and passengers, and to ensure
that no disproportionate obstacle to technical evolution is introduced.
It is necessary to reconsider whether existing restrictions in the national regulatory frameworks
are still proportionate. For example, in some Member States it is forbidden to:
 sell individual services for the shared use of a vehicle (taxi, minivan, etc.);
 resell transportation services such as bus or subway rides. These restrictions are
unnecessary and a limitation to new business models that bring efficiency and benefits
for the users.
Third, regulation should take into account the effect of these new forms of transportation on
the existing ecosystem. It is important to ascertain how shared mobility is integrated in the
existing policy goals in transport policy: congestion, decarbonisation, safety, shift to rail, etc.
Moreover, the regulatory framework should overcome insular regulations for each transport
mode. It should take into consideration the whole transport value chain, rather than each
transport mode as an isolated service.
6.3 Provision of incentives to shared mobility as a substitute to
private vehicle
It has been identified that shared mobility services have the potential to substitute the use and
ownership of private vehicles. Each shared mobility service has potential to substitute the
private car to some degree. Furthermore, the combined offer of shared mobility and mass-
transit services is particularly attractive to substitute the private vehicle. Mobility as a Service
might be the framework to foster this substitution. It is in the hands of public authorities to
accelerate the substitution of the private vehicle.
Firstly, it is recommended to promote each shared mobility service, particularly those services
with a higher potential to substitute the private vehicle, like carsharing and ridesharing. At this
stage, legal certainty would be the most beneficial contribution.
Secondly, it is recommended to reinforce the complementary effects of shared mobility in mass-
transit services. First mile/last mile complementarity can be reinforced by physically adapting
the spaces to transfer from a shared mobility service to a mass-transit service (both urban and
long distance). Integrated ticketing can also reinforce the combined use of these services.
Thirdly, it is recommended to promote Mobility as a Service, which would help to fully reap the
benefits of the combined offer of mass-transit and shared mobility services. A transparent offer
including all the alternatives to the private vehicle would accelerate substitution.
Substitution of the private vehicle will reinforce mass-transit systems and increase revenue in
the form of fares paid by users, both to urban and long distance mass-transit operators. Such
37 CJEU Case C-327/12, Ministero dello Sviluppo economico and Autorità per la vigilanza sui contratti pubblici di lavori,
servizi e forniture v SOA Nazionale Costruttori - Organismo di Attestazione SpA, EU:C:2013:827; para. 45.
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an increase should reinforce the financial situation of mass-transit operators and infrastructure
managers when they benefit from access charges. However, increase in use might require
further investment if there is already congestion.
6.4 Creation of a level playing field when shared mobility
competes with mass-transit services
It has been identified earlier in the study that some types of shared mobility, in particular
carpooling, compete with traditional mass-transit services such as long distance railway and
coach services. Carpooling is a substitute to some of these services as prices, duration of the
trip and general travelling conditions offered by carpooling are close substitutes to such
services.
A level playing field was always important for competition among traditional transport modes.
It is important to ensure that no transport mode is advantaged by unintended or unjustified
regulatory factors. This is particularly the case when there is a policy to favour a specific
transport mode, such as railways, for its beneficial effects on congestion and the environment,
and yet still on another transport mode, such as road transport, which continues to benefit from
the lack of tolls on the use of the infrastructure, etc.
Online platforms are increasing competition among different transport modes, both new and
traditional, as technology allows effectively comparing traveling conditions. Competition is
increasing not only inside each transport mode, but even more among different transport
modes.
Furthermore, the traditional equilibrium among transport modes is being modified by shared
mobility. Carpooling is increasing the competitiveness of road transportation. Technology helps
to overcome fragmentation in the offer of road transport service in private vehicles. Private
vehicles can now be used to transport passengers at a larger scale.
Therefore, it is important to ensure that private vehicle in road transportation that generates
the worst externalities in terms of congestion, environmental damage and safety is not
artificially privileged by loopholes in the regulation.
Some loopholes can be identified. As illustrated in section 5.2.4, many EU Member States do
not charge tolls for the use of high capacity roads by private vehicles. On the contrary, all
Member States charge access charges for the use of railway tracks, and these charges are
particularly burdensome in long distance high-speed services. Other loopholes are related to
the peer-to-peer business model. Non-professional transport service providers often do not
charge taxes such as VAT and they do not pay income taxes for the fees charged to passengers.
While this might be perfectly in line with local tax and social security legislation, it seems clear
that an asymmetry with other transport modes exists.
The review of national tax and social security legislation in order to accommodate non-
professional service providers seems urgent. Tax and social security legislations at a national
level were defined for the industrial society, taking for granted that services would be provided
by corporations or at least professional individuals. In many jurisdictions, it is not simple to
accommodate non-professional individuals providing peer-to-peer service through different
platforms. An individual can have a part-time job and obtain extra revenue sharing a room in
his home, carpooling when traveling long distance with his car, or exchanging some services in
his spare time. Non-professional service providers deserve legal certainty, and a regulatory
framework without unnecessary barriers to meet all the legal requirements. At the same time,
as peer-to-peer services grow in volume, often to the detriment of traditional providers, public
authorities and society as a whole cannot renounce the fiscal revenue generated by these
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services. Simple and efficient procedures to meet tax obligations can be developed to facilitate
the fulfilment of said obligations by non-professional service providers.
As a conclusion, it is recommended to ensure that new transport modes do not benefit from
regulatory advantages that would go against policy objectives to reduce congestion,
environmental damage and accidents.
6.5 Adaptation of PSO policies
Shared mobility requires a review of PSO policies in mass-transit, particularly in long distance
transport.
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 defines public passenger transport as “passenger transport
services of general economic interest provided to the public on a non-discriminatory and
continuous basis.” (Art. 2(2)(e)). The provision of such services is often subject to a
“requirement defined or determined by a competent authority in order to ensure public
passenger transport services in the general interest that an operator, if it were considering its
own commercial interests, would not assume or would not assume to the same extent or under
the same conditions without reward” (Art. 2(2)(e)). Such a requirement is termed as a PSO.
Public authorities devote significant public resources to compensate transport providers for the
provision of PSO, both urban services and long distance services. Shared mobility challenges
some of the instruments to ensure the provision of PSO (as discussed in section 5.2.3) and a
review of some PSO policies might be necessary.
New competition makes the model of internal cross-subsidisation between profitable and
unprofitable services unsustainable. When there is substitution, as in carpooling and long
distance mass-transit services, passengers will make use of shared alternatives when mass-
transit services are charged above cost to finance other unprofitable services. This seems to be
the case in coach services in Spain, where profits from high-density routes finance the provision
of unprofitable routes served under a single concession right.
The same effect might take place in a single route, as cross-subsidies take place among peak
and off-peak services. There is evidence of this effect in France for railways.
Competition from shared mobility, when effective, might call for an end to the joint franchising
of profitable and unprofitable services as a PSO compensation model.
Conversely, even when PSO are directly funded with public subsidies, migration of passengers
from mass-transit to shared mobility might put extra pressure on the PSO sustainability. As a
number of passengers migrate from mass-transit to shared mobility, it will be increasingly
costly to guarantee the existing levels of quality, particularly of frequencies.
Furthermore, most PSO compensation schemes are defined for long periods of time. Regulation
(EC) No 1370/2007 defines a public service contract maximum duration of 10 years for coaches
and 15 years for railway (Art. 4(3)). The changing reality introduced by shared mobility might
modify the economic equilibrium upon which public service contracts are built. A service quality
condition review and the derived compensations might be necessary as a result of the new
shared mobility services.
Finally, it is recommended to include shared mobility in the PSO policies on transport. Shared
mobility might participate in some PSO compensation schemes. On the one hand, shared
mobility might benefit from compensations for the provision of PSO to low-income users, as
the cost of the provision of the service is lower than in other transport modes. In this line,
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shared mobility might be more cost-effective in the provision of services in very low-density
routes. On the other hand, specific programs could be developed to ensure that shared mobility
contributes to the funding of PSO. For instance, legislation in Massachusetts imposes the
obligation to pay State authorities USD 0.20 for each ride on Transportation Network
Companies. The revenue is then distributed among state and local authorities for the
infrastructure funding (The 189th General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2016).
USD 0.10 go to municipalities for transport infrastructure funding, USD 0.5 go to a state
transportation fund, and USD 0.5 go to fund transition to competition for taxis. A similar scheme
has been proposed in New York State.
As a conclusion, shared mobility has to be taken into consideration for the redefinition of public
service policies. This seems to be particularly the case in long distance transport. Competition
from shared mobility is threatening cross-subsidies in franchises of profitable service and non-
profitable services. This is often the case when minimum frequencies are imposed and peak
services finance off-peak services. In general, if passengers migrate from mass-transit to
shared mobility, the funding of PSO will become more costly. Shared mobility has to be taken
into consideration also for the provision of PSO and for financing them.
6.6 Ensuring the sustainability of investment in physical
infrastructure
Online platforms create a data layer on top of the traditional transport activities organised
around a physical infrastructure layer and a transport service layer. The unbundling of the data
layer from the underling layers could distort the traditional mechanisms to finance physical
infrastructure.
New players might appropriate or simply erode value from a value chain that is already under
financial stress. Commissions charged by online platforms are an example of value
appropriation. Existing commissions in peer-to-peer business models are an intrinsic element
of the new business models and do not seem to challenge the sustainability of the underlying
transport providers, nor the physical infrastructures they use. If online platforms get more
active in traditional transport activities, either as intermediators of individual services or as
aggregators of multimodal mobility services, commissions extracting further value from the
traditional industry might become a challenge both for transport operators and for
infrastructure managers.
New players can also freeride the existing infrastructure benefiting from weaknesses of
traditional business models or regulatory loopholes, just as happened in the
telecommunications or energy industry. Freeriding is not currently present in the transport
industry at this stage but might arise in the future as new business models appear, particularly
in the framework of Mobility as a Service schemes.
As the new data layer grows in relevance, it is recommended to closely monitor the evolution
of platforms active in the transport industry in order to identify at an early stage arrangements
that challenge the funding of infrastructure. Challenges to funding can derive from value
appropriation by platforms in the form of commissions. They can also derive from the freeriding
of existing infrastructure, as it has been identified in telecommunications and energy. It is
important to identify and radically exclude potential freeriding benefiting from weaknesses of
traditional business models or regulatory loopholes.
6.7 Big data sharing
The central role of online platforms in the sharing economy is creating a data hub that collects
data of great value. Such a hub can be used to implement different public policies.
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There is a role for public authorities to ensure that online platforms share some of the data
they are gathering on the trips made by their users, such as itineraries, frequency, duration
and other parameters of a massive amount of trips in urban and long distance environments.
It is not advisable to impose on platforms the obligation to share personal information about
mobility patterns of specific passengers, particularly as this is sensitive personal data. Similarly,
it is not necessary to force platforms to share data about their business interactions with service
providers and passengers: matching algorithms, financial information, etc.
However, it is recommended to impose on platforms the obligation to share information at an
aggregated level as to allow a better management of transportation systems both at an urban
level and long distance. Some platforms have already started to share data. Uber announced a
specific program to share such data.
Online platforms have accumulated relevant data on each service and financial transaction they
intermediate. As a consequence, it is recommended to impose on platforms the obligation to
collaborate with public authorities for the management of some micro-transactions in the name
of their customers, such as payment of taxes.
There are experiences in other industries, such as accommodation, of management of a tax
such as the tourist tax, by an online platform in the name of the platform’s customers. In this
way, taxes can be effectively and efficiently executed on non-professional service providers.
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